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PREFACE
JL/ver since the early nineteenth century when Henry Clay was
prominent in American politics, many histories, biographies, and
articles have described his public and private characteristics. None
has fully focused on the Kentuckian's activity as a lawyer, though
for more than fifty years he earned much of his living in the legal
profession. During this half century, modern American law was
taking shape, borrowing from English experience but developing
new rules and precedents applicable to huge societal changes.
Clay was an active participant in that process.
I have examined Clay's practice at levels from county and
state jurisdictions to the Supreme Court and have drawn upon
arguments by attorneys and opinions of judges, as well as the
correspondence of Clay and others. The story is filled out from
relevant historical sources, showing the economic and political
setting. As an examination of constitutional and legal history,
this study explores the broad scope and relevance of such a con-
textual approach. Investigating Clay's career in law as well as
politics should provide useful perspectives.
As a youth in eastern Virginia, Henry was sent off by his
parents to nearby Richmond, where he was placed with the
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learned Chancellor George Wythe as a clerk, a great opportunity
to learn the basics of lawyering. Others who had profited from
Wythe's instruction became leading figures in the republic: Tho-
mas Jefferson, John Marshall, John Breckinridge, and others. So
the question whether Clay's preparation was good can be an-
swered yes. His reputation as a lawyer, of course, depended also
upon his later professional performance. In the early years of his
practice after arriving in Lexington, Kentucky, Clay quickly moved
ahead in collecting debts for eastern merchants and in handling
cases involving tangled land titles. Was his success due to his
ability or simply to his personal connections with established law-
yers? Or was it due to his marriage, which brought him into the
family of the well-to-do Thomas Hart?
Rather soon he moved into the state's politics, the beginning
of a life-long political career. As with others in similar situations,
the roles of lawyer and politician were complementary. What
effect did this combination of interests have upon his involve-
ment in matters such as banking, both state and national? Were
there objectionable aspects of these connections?
From the beginning of his legal career in 1798 and extending
to the time of his death in 1852, Clay emphasized cases about
land titles, which accounted for the greatest share of his profes-
sional income. Did this expertise contribute to his extensive in-
volvement in congressional issues of public land policy, such as
generous preemption by settlers and less generous distribution of
proceeds from land sales to the states?
Increasingly, Clay the prominent politician and Clay the law-
yer confronted issues about slavery. At first, they were questions
of a local nature, but soon they involved broader issues attract-
ing both his roles in politics and law. Such was true of his han-
dling the important constitutional case of Groves v Slaughter
(1841) concerning the interstate slave trade. Now he had moved
to a conservative view on slavery, emphasizing concessions and
compromises on this important subject in Congress. It was a re-
vealing illustration of his position in court being affected by his
position in politics. How much and with what effect those two
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elements of Clay's activity interacted are questions worth consid-
eration in relation both to the general history of the nation and
to republican principles.
To understand his impact on his times and later institutions,
it is also necessary to consider his personal traits. Unquestion-
ably, he was gifted intellectually. And he knew it. Though not
often, he could make sure that rivals and adversaries knew it too.
Compared to other prominent figures of the day, he was unusu-
ally interested in reading materials related not only to the legal
profession but also to advances in livestock breeding and horti-
culture, both of which he applied on his estate "Ashland." He
was an authority on the important staple hemp, used for bagging
southern cotton and making rope. And for much of his life he
supported higher education at Transylvania University as legal
counsel, faculty member, and trustee. In Congress he succeeded
in getting legislation on the federal court system that required
more judges and improved procedure.
Of course, Clay was not free of fault. As a young man, he
was known for his hearty drinking and lively gambling habits.
But as time passed, there was much less of this, notwithstanding
rather fixed disapproving views of some historians, especially on
his early years. He was prone to act from anger both in politics
and in individual relations. For example, not long after he had
clashed with opponents during debate in the state legislature, he
became involved in an angry quarrel with his adversary,
Humphrey Marshall, and challenged him to a duel. Fortunately
the outcome on the field of honor across the Ohio River ended
without much bloodshed. And after the disappointing presiden-
tial election of 1824, Clay challenged the erratic John Randolph
to a duel, though this encounter, too, did not result in injury. In
later years, Clay responded to perceived affronts with argument
instead of risking physical confrontation.
This study of Clay's career as a lawyer begins with an ac-
count of the legal scene in which Clay operated, providing an
overview of the court systems, federal and state, in which he prac-
ticed, and sketching the ideologies that shaped debates about the
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proper nature of American legal institutions. The study then ex-
amines Clay's early legal career, up to the period during and after
the War of 1812, at which point his attention shifted for a de-
cade or so to political affairs and away from the practice of law.
The remainder of this book examines the particular areas in which
Clay directed his later legal work: economic issues concerning
land ownership, bankruptcy, and debt collection; banking mat-
ters pursued on behalf of the Bank of the United States and the
Bank of Kentucky; and issues related to the legal status of the
interstate slave trade. The study considers both the important
constitutional cases in which Clay participated and also the far
greater number of nonconstitutional cases in which he served as
counsel. The picture that emerges from this study of Clay's ca-
reer is one of a skilled lawyer influenced by his political commit-
ments who addressed in an informed way the central legal and
economic issues of his day.
I am greatly indebted to the editors of The Papers of Henry Clay
(11 vols., University Press of Kentucky, 1959-1992) for their ex-
cellent collection of source materials and editorial annotations. I
have drawn heavily upon them in this study, as my citations indi-
cate. Noel Kinnamon provided excellent copyediting, and I am
indebted to him for his contribution. As always, my wife, Cynthia
Lewis Baxter, was involved through every stage of this enterprise.
For this study I also received expert guidance and assistance from
my son, Hugh Baxter.
THE LEGAL SCENE
In 1792, when Henry Clay was a youth of fifteen, he had begun
an apprenticeship in Virginia with the respected chancellor and
professor of law, George Wythe. Here in Richmond reports of
legal reform in the nation were arriving. Debate over legal re-
form was particularly lively in Kentucky, because at that time it
was being detached as a new state from the Old Dominion. Across
the mountains delegates were framing a state constitution, a pro-
cess that generated spirited argument about fundamental prin-
ciples of government. Though information about Henry's
observations of what was occurring in this process has not sur-
vived, we know he could later recall this important process in-
volving law and courts in the two states.
There were two opposing viewpoints in a rising debate about
what shape the new Kentucky constitution should take. One was
that of the radicals, advocating a bold extension of the heritage
of the American Revolution, of sweeping change from excessive
governmental power, from privileged classes, and from a legal
system with elements of English common law. The other view
was held by the moderates, who wanted gradual change, com-
bining experience with old institutions and cautious reform. The
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radicals maintained that there was an undue influence by law-
yers, belonging to an encrusted, untrustworthy profession. A re-
public, they believed, ought to reduce the dangerous political and
social power of this elite group.
When the constitutional convention of 1792 assembled, the
proceedings were already planned by George Nicholas, a moder-
ate. Like young Clay, he had read law under Chancellor Wythe,
as many others then did. Although Nicholas had only recently
arrived in Kentucky, he presented a carefully planned agenda that
showed promise of being adopted by the delegates. He wanted a
government of balanced powers, including a judiciary that must
check the operations of the other branches. At the top would be
a court of appeals to monitor lower tribunals by reviewing their
decisions. Furthermore, judges would have to be better qualified
than many judges of that time. This appellate court would re-
solve land questions—indeed, Nicholas urged much attention to
land law by all parts of the government, for that subject was
central to the development of Kentucky's economy. And he pur-
sued a policy stimulating commercial growth, which he thought
was a primary support of the state. Here were connections of the
economy with the law—perhaps natural connections for Nicho-
las, given his extensive financial interests in the state. Overall,
Nicholas would borrow characteristics of the recently adopted
United States Constitution. He also recommended adopting the
common law of England, despite radical opposition, as well as
continuing observance of the laws of Virginia in Kentucky. On
this point there would be staunch disagreement. That would be
true particularly in the future leading land case of Green v Riddle
(1824) in the Supreme Court, one in which Clay would be much
involved.
The convention was quite agreeable to Nicholas's agenda and
approved it with few exceptions. He soon followed this triumph
by smoothly managing the election of the first governor, Isaac
Shelby, a revered pioneer and military veteran. Yet when the im-
portant question of land law arose, this explosive issue caused
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vigorous disagreement. Years earlier, the Virginia assembly had
passed a law regulating acquisition and verification of land titles.
A commission had adjudicated over 3,200 disputes, which were
upheld by the supreme court of Virginia. Radicals in the Ken-
tucky legislature and the appellate court were upset because claim-
ants were not residents in their new state. The result was to stir
up another radical-moderate battle, centering on the court sys-
tem. Nicholas had lost some control of affairs.
A second constitutional convention was called in 1799.
Lively debate on judicial reform followed but was crowded out
of acceptance by a discussion of whether and how to adopt any
change. John Breckinridge, Clay's good friend who was now
the moderate leader, needed to give higher priority to endorsing
and circulating the Jeffersonian resolution across the country
condemning the federal sedition law passed the previous year.
This situation allowed his opponents an opportunity to intro-
duce different proposals.
One adversary, Felix Grundy, of the less-developed Green
River area to the south, was tireless in behalf of his circuit-court
plan with radical features. At last in 1802 he succeeded in getting
the measure through but only over the governor's veto. Lawyers
like Clay would have to argue cases before county district courts,
partly composed of untrained assistants to circuit-riding judges.
Moderates had little confidence in the capacity of these ama-
teurs. Nevertheless, much of this judicial branch lasted at least
until 1816. No doubt, moderates were somewhat consoled when
they learned that similar radical movements in Massachusetts
and Pennsylvania had been defeated.
The protracted conflict in Kentucky had been only one phase
of the larger crisis concerning the relation of legal systems to
republican government. Widespread dissatisfaction among
Jeffersonians about law and lawyers, about their incompatibility
with the people's fundamental values, would continue for a while.
In Washington, President Jefferson and his extensive following
were very troubled by decisions of the Supreme Court, particu-
larly by the Marbury case (1803), advancing judicial review of
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congressional legislation, and also by the rulings in the chief
justice's federal circuit court, blocking conviction of Aaron Burr
for treason, and by the failed impeachment trial of Justice Samuel
Chase in the Senate. It added up to strong political feeling about
the administration of justice across the land. Was the cause of the
problem an aggressive incursion against a democratic society?
Even Henry Clay would ask similar questions when he worried
about the impact of some decisions and policies.1
During this early period of the Supreme Court's history, law-
yers significantly influenced the direction of American legal de-
velopment. So in understanding what the Court ruled, one must
take this factor into account. And in the early nineteenth century,
the federal bar was composed of some interesting and gifted per-
sonalities. Among them certainly was William Pinkney, an elo-
quent, dandified figure, who was acknowledged to be in the front
rank of constitutional lawyers. Among his impressive arguments
was McCulloch v Maryland (1819), upholding the validity of the
national bank's charter. Other notable figures were Thomas
Emmet, an energetic Irish expatriate, and William Wirt, the United
States attorney general for a long while.
In the view of many contemporaries, Daniel Webster be-
came the head of the bar. His arguments for national powers
and against state legislation, such as in the famous Dartmouth
College case (1819), were generally in tune with the trend of
John Marshall's court, but less so in the later Taney-Jacksonian
years. He was co-counsel with Clay in several important argu-
ments, including a number in behalf of the Bank of the United
States and an interesting one concerning the interstate slave
trade, Groves v Slaughter (1842).
In these early years many lawyers coming before the Court
were easterners, due to arduous conditions of travel from other
sections. There were quite a few, however, who could come be-
cause they were also members of Congress or had business with
the government. Clay was one of this sort.
Procedures in hearings were less complicated than those to-
day. Oral argument was a principal part of handling business.
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Written briefs and even some court reports were less so. This
encouraged long hours of lawyers' presentations and emphasized
oratory, not a little entertainment for visitors who made their
way down to a cramped courtroom in the Capitol's basement.2
In framing briefs and making oral arguments, lawyers drew
upon published legal authorities. Old English commentaries by
Coke and Blackstone were continuing references, over which law-
yers, such as Clay and Webster, had once struggled when enter-
ing practice. Like others, they now grounded cases also on
American volumes by Joseph Story, St. George Tucker, and James
Kent. By these routes English common law remained a staple in
shaping materials for judges as well as attorneys. That bothered
many critics, so much so that in a number of states, such as Ken-
tucky, reformers sought to prohibit acceptance of this source,
even in the form of citation by counsel. Clay did not support
such a measure. In arguing a case in the Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals, he suffered the judges' warning that he was prohibited from
citing an English common law decision. He had knowingly done
so, for he well remembered he had opposed passage of such a
restriction when he had been a member of the state legislature.
But in Marshall's Supreme Court there was no hindrance to reli-
ance on those old materials. Besides, the federal courts had juris-
diction on questions of common law, conferred by congressional
judiciary acts since 1789.3
Among the numerous persons serving as justices of this tri-
bunal, Chief Justice John Marshall stands out as preeminent. He
occupied the post for thirty-four years, as long as any other mem-
ber of the Court. Appointed in 1801 by the outgoing Federalist
President John Adams, he died in office in 1835. With little for-
mal legal instruction, he spent only a few weeks under Wythe's
guidance in Virginia and learned mostly on his own. He had the
same connection with the eminent chancellor that Jefferson,
Breckinridge, Clay, and many others had, though not all took
the same political route later on.
Soon after the chief justice came to his position, Jeffersonian
Republican and Federalist politicians were warring against one
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another concerning congressional reorganization of the judiciary
and the use of Marshall's judicial review in the Marbury case
(1803). It has been the prevailing view up to the present that he
turned the Court around from a weak, nearly insignificant insti-
tution to a position of great importance. At first, Clay agreed
with Jefferson that the new order was destructive, but he came to
admire Marshall's approach to law. This was in spite of Clay's
bitter confrontations with the chief justice's relatives in Kentucky,
such as his brother-in-law Humphrey Marshall, to the point of
dueling with him. And a number of other relatives, particularly
land claimants, were opponents against Clay's clients. Yet there
was a subsequent philosophical linkage between the two, Clay
the lawyer and Marshall the judge, in political and economic
terms.4
Among other justices, the learned Joseph Story was quite
important. The New Englander also served a long time, a decade
after Marshall's death. In addition to his work in court, he was a
pioneering professor in the Harvard law school. Though a
Jeffersonian Republican and an appointee by President James
Madison, he became an arch conservative in politics, squaring
with Clay's Whig program. In his later days he seemed isolated,
as President Andrew Jackson created a majority by his appoin-
tees on the bench. It became a Democratic tribunal where poor
Story was neutralized. Clay, too, was unhappy about the Court's
new composition.5
Though Marshall had presided over a tribunal of coopera-
tive colleagues until his death in 1835, one of them, William
Johnson, had dissented frequently. His opinions could suit some
of his Jeffersonian friends but tended to be obscurely expressed,
even to the point of creating doubt whether he concurred or dis-
sented with the decision. Anyway, he was an interesting person
and a desirable member of the Court.
Clay had a degree of influence when it came to identifying
the appointment of justices. When a vacancy arose for a member
who would also travel on the federal circuit in Kentucky, he got
the appointment of Robert Trimble by President John Quincy
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Adams. Trimble was known to support Clay's current effort for
state bankruptcy legislation whereas Thomas Todd, who died at
this juncture, had disagreed on constitutional grounds. Filling
the vacancy with Trimble would tip the Court favorably on this
question of state bankruptcy power for his client Ogden, Clay
believed. Though he got the appointment of Trimble, Clay still
lost some points in the pending case before the Supreme Court
on this subject in Ogden v Saunders (1827).
As an outgoing secretary of state, Clay tried again for an-
other appointment two years later when Trimble died. He pressed
President Adams to appoint a good friend, John Crittenden, an-
other Kentuckian. Clay asked Marshall to help persuade Adams
to do so. But Marshall refused because he thought it was im-
proper to intervene. "It has the appearance of assuming more
than I am willing to assume," he answered, even though he obvi-
ously had a high opinion of Crittenden's qualifications. "Were I
myself to designate the successor to Mr. Trimble, I do not know
the man I could prefer to him," he wrote. Did Clay show
Marshall's note to the President? At any rate, it was impossible
to get Senate approval because Jackson had been elected presi-
dent, and his followers wanted to wait during the interim until
the Jacksonians in Congress could confirm a Democratic justice.6
The Court's work changed very much during the first half of
the nineteenth century both in character and volume. The popu-
lation of the country increased from five to twenty-three million
persons. In settled territory, it extended from thirteen original
eastern states to a frontier beginning to reach the Far West. Its
economic growth mounted as industrialization and urbanization
developed spectacularly, concurrent with a dramatic flow of settle-
ment of vast transmontane lands. These trends obviously affected
operations and expansion of government at all levels, including
state and national legislatures and courts. With only a modest
supply of resources and time the Supreme Court had much to do
in these years. One must remember that the justices considered
protracted arguments, decided many novel questions, and handed
down intricate decisions in premodern conditions. They had no
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clerks, nothing but quills and ink for writing in their own hands.
They listened hour after hour to loquacious arguments of coun-
sel, afterward reading what written briefs they might get in very
compact form, if any, exchanging views in free-flowing, informal
conferences back at their boarding house, composing their opin-
ions tediously and often reading them orally in the dim light of
the Capitol basement. Then they might set out to ride circuit
along rugged roads and perilous river channels to remote, lower
federal courts. How different from modern procedure!
The Supreme Court had a full docket of cases through this
period. It is well known today that the Court heard an increasing
number of cases on constitutional law, but it had many more
nonconstitutional ones—791 of them during the years 1816 to
1835, compared to only 66 constitutional cases. They came in
because the parties were citizens of different states or because the
questions involved laws of the United States. The cases were au-
thorized by congressional legislation.7
Subjects in these twenty years mainly concerned contracts
and real property questions. Marshall and Clay were well in-
formed in those areas. The trend by the 1830s was away from
numerous early maritime issues, which had not interested Clay,
who argued only one case of that sort in the Court.8
The effects of economic change in the country upon the work
of the justices are apparent. One subject was the important de-
velopment of corporations, legally as well as commercially. Their
standing as parties in the court strengthened steadily by a line of
decisions, one of which was the Dartmouth College case (1819),
over the next thirty years. Significant questions coming into the
Court involved many banking corporations, as in Osborn
(1824)—the case establishing the Court's jurisdiction to decide
cases brought against state officials by the national bank, incor-
porated by Congress. Osborn showed the way toward increased
judicial business.
Clay acquired his professional expertise in the West where
land was a leading economic interest. In these cases he often had
to reconcile old feudal rules with changing circumstances in a
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modern setting. This was a slow process, which now appears to
have tilted toward antiquated law too often in the hands of the
chief justice, no doubt reflecting his strong personal involvement
in land grants and speculation. In Johnson v Pannel (1817), for
example, he upheld a poorly described claim to land, supported
only by "common intelligence." Here he seemed to rely not only
upon ancient authority but sympathy for the claimant.9
American jurisprudence drew upon the current concept of
republicanism, aiming to protect the people against dangerous
governmental power and social privilege by an emphasis upon
the popular basis of government and society. In this conception,
remnants of the old order must give way to a different legal sys-
tem infused by republican principles. Republicanism, premised
upon the ethical purity of citizens as well as officials, was a widely
held ideology in the nation during the early nineteenth century.
Marshall's court was affected by this ideology, though some of
its decisions shielding vested rights and governmental powers
posed a counter force.10 Furthermore, an earlier variant of re-
publican ideology, called classical republicanism, accepted dif-
ferences of citizens' status produced by economic conditions,
looking very much like social classes. It was a trait illustrated in
the law practice of the future Jacksonian president, Martin Van
Buren, as shown in a recent biography. The lawyer-politician
worked for a long while against valuable holdings of old manors
by proprietary grants in New York. He obtained a legislative
revocation of some but not all of the original privileges of land-
lords on the ground of defective provisions extended by the as-
sembly. Here was a modification of what could have been a
broader decision.11
Republicanism was a familiar term in politics as well as law.
It was a contrast to earlier American colonial conditions, which
had been imposed by British imperial control. Jeffersonians now
used it to describe their party as Republican in the 1790s and
beyond. In this sense, Clay subscribed to it. From the time he
was a youngster in Chancellor Wythe's office in Virginia, he saw
and admired Jefferson, Madison, and other Republican leaders
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of that party, the adherents of states' rights. John Breckinridge
and other young men with similar backgrounds were of the same
mind. When talking about politics, Clay often declared his con-
stitutional views had been clearly laid out in the Virginia and
Kentucky states' rights resolutions of 1798 against the alien and
sedition laws. He continued to say so on later occasions when his
comments had some inconsistencies.
Clay was not unique in his flexible positions, for the very idea
of republicanism was flexible too. He became the chief advocate
of an American system for governmental impetus to economic
growth by protective tariffs, internal improvements, and national
banks. In this combination, there was a mix of Jeffersonian and
Hamiltonian thought. Clay's model of desirable policies sought to
accommodate both practical needs and ideology.12
Abraham Lincoln in his legal and political career from the
1830s into the Civil War years helped define the character of
republicanism. As a Clay Whig, he joined the movement for an
economic basis of national policy, which he believed necessary
for progress. As a lawyer, he represented railroad interests, which
he believed were contributing to that end. And more to the point,
he was a founder of the Republican party, applying republican
principles to prevent the expansion of slavery. Midway in the
war for the Union, he voiced a view of the American republic
that has gone down in history as a central theme. Among other
contributions was his Gettysburg address, defining the republi-
can credo. His statesmanship rested not only upon politics but
upon legal institutions, which he understood well.13
Thus, although an analysis of republicanism is helpful as a
guide for understanding early American legal history, it does not
lend itself to uniform conclusions. It was used by different per-
sons with different interests and behavior, even to defend the in-
stitution of slavery before the Civil War.14 In truth, it was quite
unstable. Unquestionably, it was an elusive ideology then and
remains so now. Nevertheless, it does provide a cautious view of
past thought and conduct.15
Another interpretive theme in explaining legal development
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has been the rise of a market economy during the early nine-
teenth century. It involved industrialization and the acceleration
of commercial growth. These tendencies often undermined the
idea of classical republicanism by weakening the importance of
social status and emphasizing dynamic roles of property and the
bargaining power of individuals in a competitive setting. Still,
there was a strong demand for tariffs to protect industry, though
contrary pressure for free trade as well. Financially, state and
national systems of banking also created issues of vigorous con-
troversy. All these were the subjects of Clay's involvement in both
politics and law.16
During the early years of Clay's practice, he was involved in
important changes of both procedures and substance in law. Rules
for judicial admission of evidence were sometimes unclear or in-
adequate, allowing arbitrary decisions and miscarriage of jus-
tice. Lawyers often drew upon English treatises and reports, such
as the widely used manual of Chitty. The result, however, could
be mistakes in the intricate process of pleading. As a young mem-
ber of the state legislature, Clay contributed to an improved code
for the courts to follow. There was also a problem with the pro-
cedure at equity which long ago in England had been a liberal
option to the common law but had grown too hidebound and
therefore needed improvement. Clay observed the persistent con-
fusion about when and how to use equity in an important case
up from Louisiana near the close of his lengthy career.17 He him-
self faced serious procedural difficulty in criminal law, too, where
judges often mishandled the admission of evidence and instruc-
tions to juries. True enough, he benefitted from these deficiencies
when he could range widely in defending clients, especially by
resorting to his eloquence at trial. But criminal cases were not an
important part of his practice.
In addition to these involvements in strengthening the legal
system, Clay served on the Senate Judiciary Committee. In that
role he secured passage of a measure to add another Supreme
Court justice, who was assigned also to the federal circuit court
in Kentucky. The latter assignment greatly relieved the impos-
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sible burden upon the existing United States district judge. Oth-
ers had tried to do something about the problem but had failed.
Then there was Clay's service for a time as a professor of law at
Transylvania University in Lexington. Altogether, his professional
credentials were quite good.
The question whether to adopt or reject the common law
persisted, even though congressional judiciary laws recognized it
in defining the scope of federal jurisdiction. And lawyers, includ-
ing Clay, had studied English and American common-law trea-
tises in preparation for their careers and did cite them despite
continuing criticism that the common law was not consistent with
the republican character of America.
A thorough study by Nelson of the "Americanization" of the
common law in Massachusetts shows that it consistently sup-
ported economic growth. Thus it pushed aside an earlier empha-
sis of religious elements in the state's courts and favored creditors
more than debtors as time passed.18 Even if religion had been
more influential in New England than in other jurisdictions, it is
still clear that everywhere the economic impact was much the
same. Common law remained a significant factor in the country's
legal systems. Undoubtedly, this was true in Clay's Kentucky and
in other states in the West. Another example from New England
was the Dartmouth College case (1819). In arguing it in the Su-
preme Court, Webster relied heavily upon the English common
law rule of charitable trusts in defining the legal status of this
educational corporation. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion was
very influential in constitutional history, drawing as it did from
counsel's argument. In general, this precedent from the extensive
list of Webster's cases illustrates the broad acceptance of the com-
mon law in the United States. It was typical of a trend in the
young nation.
Some exceptions remained. In Louisiana for a time civil law
survived into midcentury. One of Clay's important cases in the
Supreme Court was Livingston v Story (1837), involving his op-
ponent in Jacksonian politics, Edward Livingston.19 It turned on
the question of applying the civil code, which interestingly
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Livingston had helped establish in Louisiana. But Clay argued
for relying upon it, while Livingston's attorney also interestingly
called for invoking the common law. Clay lost, illustrating the
trend toward the common law throughout the country. Still, Clay
felt comfortable about retaining the civil law in its period of de-
cline. Often he had cases in New Orleans, where some of his
relatives and close friends lived. There was a similar trend in-
volving Spanish law in Florida and Missouri, ending in a general
preference for the common law despite some mingling of cul-
tural backgrounds.
From the beginning of his practice, Clay emphasized land as
his particular specialty. His choice of focus was natural since he
began his legal career where land was so important. It was a
powerful dynamic in the new state's economy, and here was a
great opportunity to get ahead, as Clay's rapid successes demon-
strated. In the Blue Grass a young lawyer could easily attract
clients to acquire land titles and collect handsome fees, often in
the form of land.
But there were complications challenging the attorney. One
was the horrid tangle of titles. Much of the desirable tracts had
been registered or otherwise claimed in Virginia before Kentucky's
detachment from the Old Dominion. Now laws and records in
the two commonwealths were incompatible or very unclear. Clay's
cases demonstrate this situation. There was also the fact that
Kentucky's procedures were utterly inadequate. Boundaries of
land were not well identified. Rivers and creeks, trees, and fuzzy
memories of settlers, all made for legal dispute. Added to this
situation was the inexpert, if not corrupt recording of sales and
titles in the capitol at Frankfort, allowing mistakes and fraud. It
was credibly said that Kentucky was a lawyer's paradise to col-
lect fees from land cases.
A complication arose in handling land cases from Ohio where,
years earlier, Virginia had granted many tracts to veteran sol-
diers of the American Revolution; some of these tracts were
claimed also by Kentuckians. Another complication could be the
condition of multiple ownership of property, based upon a form
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of joint tenancy with purchasers sharing title and able to use or
sell their portions of the land. An optional pattern was so-called
tenancy in common, which allowed individual rights to market
parts of tracts, free of other tenants. It was preferred by specula-
tors rather than residents and was a widespread procedure in
Kentucky.
Though borrowing from English practice, American features
of land law were not as restrictive, encouraging development and
permitting transfer and individual control instead of retaining
old barriers. Nevertheless, Clay's federal cases in the Marshall
era revealed the tendency of the chief justice and that of others
such as Justice Story, a tendency to hold on to ancient rules of the
common law, sometimes to feudal institutions such as propri-
etary privileges. If Marshall innovated to an extent in formulat-
ing new legal doctrines, he was surprisingly rigid on this subject.
The Supreme Court, speaking through one of his fellow justices,
reflected this orientation in Clay's case of Green v Biddle (1824).
It was the lawyer's most important effort on a land question,
though a very disappointing failure.
Overall, Kentucky did encourage marketing by easy require-
ments of title and transfer. Its policies often favored the actual
occupant of land, it seemed, rather than claimants relying upon
dubious public records. This was true of the doctrine of adverse
possession by a settler for a period with little, if any, formal proof.
Land would be an important and accessible medium of progress
in this economy.20
So this was the setting in which Clay the lawyer would prac-
tice in the half century after his arrival from the East. With a
good introduction to the law over several years in Virginia, he
had followed the westward path of many others to the new state
of Kentucky. Its growing, promising society encouraged pros-
pects of the young man of twenty-one, likely to attain a promi-
nent standing in politics as well as law. Both features of his career
would develop favorably and interact with one another, much as
they did in the case of his friends and associates. It was a season
of mobility for him and his contemporaries.
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His personal character was, of course, an important asset in
the career he was now beginning. Then and throughout his many
years as a lawyer-politician, he would project energy and magne-
tism. Some would say he could be overbearing, indeed egotisti-
cal. Yet he drew upon these traits to become a bold, often
constructive figure, whether in the practice of law or in the poli-
tics of a half century. In history he is better known as a partisan
leader, unceasingly seeking election to the presidency, which meant
he sought his individual advancement more than contributions
to the public good. Even if true, was he much different from
adversaries like Andrew Jackson or party colleagues like Daniel
Webster?
As a lawyer, he would project traits similar to those of a poli-
tician. It was common then much more than now to carry on an
active legal practice while holding public office. Obviously there
could be desirable effects at a time when institutions of the re-
public were taking shape and could benefit from this connection.
But that obviously depended upon the ability and performance
of those combining these dual roles. Could Clay do so?
It would not take long for him to show he could. He soon
gained an understanding of public affairs and the legal system by
attending meetings of a debating society in Lexington, not only
listening carefully but explaining his views. He could attract wide
notice and approval in this fashion. His skill in speaking was a
decided asset, either in the courtroom or a political gathering.
Without restraint, he explained merits and defects in state and
national constitutions, as when he advocated the gradual eman-
cipation of slaves. The impact was attractive as well as instruc-
tive. His delivery was crisp and very moving.

EARLY PRACTICE
Gday was a native Virginian, the son of a church minister in
Hanover County a few miles north of Richmond. His father died
when Henry was four, and his mother soon remarried. As a child,
he received scanty instruction from a rural schoolmaster when
not performing tasks required on a farm. Carrying bags of grain
on horseback to market along paths cleared in a forest, he ac-
quired the nickname of Millboy of the Slashes. In later years, his
image was often that of a statesman's ascent from humble ori-
gins to national fame. But that was not entirely accurate. His
mother owned substantial property, and his stepfather Henry
Watkins was a person of some means. Nevertheless, in 1791,
when Henry was fourteen, the Watkinses decided to move west-
ward to Kentucky, as so many in their region were doing. His
parents felt it best to leave him in Richmond for work and hope-
fully a better education.1
At first, the lad was employed in one of the town's stores, but
before departure his stepfather had arranged with the clerk of
the state court of chancery to take him on as an assistant. By this
route, young Clay gained favorable notice of George Wythe, well-
known chancellor of this court. Wythe, now seventy, had a dis-
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tinguished reputation as a signer of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, learned professor of classics and law at nearby William
and Mary College, and teacher of many public figures, including
Thomas Jefferson and John Marshall.
Clay served as a secretary, taking dictation from the chancel-
lor, crippled by arthritis. Another major chore was to copy and
file documents. Wythe was impressed by his intelligence and win-
ning manner. True enough, judicial and academic demands upon
Wythe's time did not allow as much legal instruction as Clay
would have liked or needed. Yet he fared decidedly better than
most apprentices—indeed, better than he himself, contemporar-
ies, and biographers would later portray.
For one thing, the wider scene was conducive to getting ahead.
In and around the state capitol he saw fascinating, gifted per-
sons: Secretary of State Jefferson, Congressman James Madison
(both intimate friends of Wythe), Chief Judge Edmund Pendleton
of the Virginia high court, future Supreme Court justice Bushrod
Washington, and John Marshall who would skillfully head that
tribunal. There were also promising youths, such as Littleton
Tazewell, Walter Jones, and Thomas Ritchie, all stimulating
friends. One vehicle for both intellectual growth and social en-
joyment was the debating society, which sharpened valuable ora-
torical talents of aspiring lawyers and politicians. Another outlet,
of course, was the crowded barroom.
He spent his final year of study with one of Virginia's leading
lawyers, Robert Brooke, a former governor and currently state
attorney general. Brooke could open a practicing lawyer's per-
spective and was more accessible because Clay lived with the
Brooke family. His close relations with them lasted for many years,
especially with a younger brother, Francis Brooke, whom he found
very compatible.2
On November 6, 1797, at age twenty, he appeared before
the three members of the state's court of appeals, produced a
certificate of preparation from Robert Brooke, and after what
was probably routine procedure received a license to practice in
the Old Dominion's courts.3 Within the month he set out for
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Kentucky, joining the tide of migration to this former western
county of Virginia, now a bustling state in the Union. He arrived
at the town of Lexington in the center of the bluegrass, which
was already claiming the character of another American Athens.
In spring 1798, just before his twenty-first birthday, Henry Clay
obtained his license to practice in Lexington's Fayette County
Court, with subsequent certification in other locations—all au-
tomatic recognitions of his license back in Richmond, it seems.4
The tall, thin newcomer's ready wit and mobile expressions
attracted attention at once. He had a bold, charming style. Very
sociable, he could drink whiskey, swear, and gamble with the
best of a circle of young men in this western town. Already he
had learned how to use his resource of eloquent speech with great
effect. And he was not hesitant in moving center stage in the
political arena, whether to urge amending the state constitution
to emancipate slaves5 or to join fellow Jeffersonian Republicans
in condemning the Federalist administration in Washington. His
fellow lawyers seemed quite compatible: George Bibb, a future
chief justice of Kentucky; John Breckinridge, soon to become a
member of Jefferson's cabinet; Robert Wickliffe, one of a family
long active in politics; and especially James Brown, also a former
student of Wythe but a few years older than Clay.
Brown became Clay's brother-in-law. They married two
daughters of Thomas Hart, a leading merchant-manufacturer who
had come to Kentucky in its early stage of growth and had gained
a sizeable fortune. Brown would remain in Lexington for a few
years before moving to New Orleans. Clay stayed and obviously
benefitted socially and professionally from his connection with
the Harts. He and eighteen-year-old Lucretia were married in
April 1799 and soon built a house next to the Harts and across
Mill Street from his law office.6
Without delay he was attracting business on what seems to
have been a rather litigious scene. Much of it came before the
county court in Lexington, but some of it in the capital at Frank-
fort and in similar county courts throughout the state. These tri-
bunals had a general jurisdiction, including civil and criminal
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suits, and they employed procedures of both law and equity by a
traveling state judge and two local laymen with uneven or no
expertise. Then the lawyer carried some cases to Kentucky's Court
of Appeals, whose proceedings were reported in published vol-
umes annually. Beyond that layer was one of the several national
circuit courts in the country, composed of only an overworked
judge from the United States District Court in Kentucky. In addi-
tion to district cases, that person had also to conduct the kinds of
circuit business that in older states was handled by a traveling
federal Supreme Court justice. There was deep dissatisfaction with
this uneven feature of the judiciary in the new West, and Clay
would try to get reform.7
Much of his practice involved collecting debts owed to east-
ern merchants. For a while this was one of Clay's chief sources of
income. He received a percentage (5 percent or more) of what he
collected either by getting a court's judgment or by warning he
might file suit to seize property. His mercantile clients, creditors
in Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Baltimore, and other places, were
themselves hard-pressed as the economy tightened due to a sharp
decline of foreign trade during the European war at the turn of
the century. And the financial condition of their western custom-
ers was anything but liquid.8
One can understand Clay's situation by looking at his close
connection for more than a decade with a prominent merchant
of Baltimore, William Taylor. Their active correspondence shows
he made an active well-organized effort to shake delinquent debt-
ors into payment. His personal attention to detail impressed Tay-
lor, who responded with his thanks.9 Where Clay encountered
special trouble was finding satisfactory ways of forwarding re-
ceipts he collected. A persistent difficulty was getting enough
acceptable bank notes and other media. He resorted not only to
bills of exchange but to promissory notes, to several kinds of
paper, even to agricultural produce. Would the merchant accept
cordage, an available Kentucky product, he asked?10 Then an-
other vexation was the unreliability of the mail, due to stealth or
mishandling in transit. Perhaps he ought to use the familiar tech-
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nique of cutting notes in half and sending them on at different
times, he thought.11
Anyway, his compensation from this client was gratifying: it
totaled over $7,000 through the years 1800 to 1803, and more
came later. This fee was not excessive, Clay argued when Taylor
complained, for the rate was customary and freely stipulated.
Clay was always alive to what remuneration he could get as a
lawyer.12
Important as early questions of debt were, those about land
were far more important in the long run of Clay's career. Land
law became the specialty in which he could claim unusual exper-
tise over a period of fifty years. One reason he moved in that
direction was the great economic significance of land to westerners
especially. In Kentucky after Clay's arrival, land was certainly a
powerful dynamic both to hardy settlers and to aggressive entre-
preneurs. But there were difficult legal problems because Ken-
tucky had not become a state until 1792, and there were earlier
grants of the same locations from Virginia. Furthermore, the Old
Dominion had previously ceded an area north of the Ohio River
to the United States as a temporary national territory which be-
came subject to a congressional land ordinance. Applied to many
other parts of the union, this ordinance of 1785 had established
a policy of rectangular survey prior to sale and allowed fewer
disputes and less litigation about boundaries there. In Kentucky,
however, transactions of registry and later transfer of title were
about as uncertain as anyone could imagine. Deeds described
tracts as bordered by particular trees as well as forks and branches
of creeks, often identified by squatter settlers or local lore. These
were the confusing conditions the lawyer faced.13
An early piece of business consisted of assisting his father-in-
law Thomas Hart in drawing up a deed for property, valued at
six hundred pounds. It was only the start of recurrent work he
performed for Hart and family.14 That the young man had al-
ready gained the confidence of clients is illustrated by the power
of attorney given him by a Virginian to convey as he saw fit.
An even better sign of his reputation was the trust displayed
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by John Breckinridge, the prominent Jeffersonian Republican sena-
tor, when leaving for Washington. He turned over a number of
pending cases to Clay, nearly all concerning sizeable amounts of
land. Though Clay attended to preparation and hearings of these
land disputes over a four-year period, he got judgments in only
three. The others were settled out of court, dropped, or dismissed.15
An interesting retainer involved a large acreage along the
Licking River, requiring protracted work and promising a hand-
some bonus for victory. A group of claimants included Thomas
Bodley, clerk of the Fayette County Court, and Thomas Marshall,
who had surveyed an extensive area of early Kentucky and was
the father of the Supreme Court chief justice. Clay entered an
agreement with adversaries of this group and was promised twenty
pounds for every thousand acres he might recover against
Marshall and a sizeable payment from recoveries against
Marshall's associates. The well-known agrarian philosopher, John
Taylor, also sought his help in a shaky claim to some of this land.
Clay lost the decisions because they rested upon the date of ac-
tual settlement by the other side instead of the date his clients
had only entered title.16
He fared no better against the Marshall interests when he
carried a land case to the Supreme Court in 1807, his first ap-
pearance there. Opposing counsel was Humphrey Marshall,
brother-in-law and cousin of the chief justice and currently Clay's
bitter adversary in Kentucky politics as leader of the Federalists.
In fact, Humphrey's wife was also recorded as a party to the
controversy, since her father, Thomas Marshall, had entered title
to this tract, too. At issue was a very large area along Green
River, a typical grant by Virginia before Kentucky statehood,
described in terms of a river branch and trees with marks no
longer visible. Clay contended that such a description was too
vague and furthermore that the question was merely one of fact,
not of law, therefore ineligible for appeal to this court. Despite
that persuasive point, John Marshall's colleague on the bench,
Justice William Johnson, delivered an opinion that these vaguely
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worded cessions would have to be interpreted loosely. At least
the location of Green River was indisputable, he jauntily observed.
Much land litigation related to military warrants awarded to
veterans of the Revolutionary War. Were they superior to claims
based only upon settlement? Clay made one of his numerous ar-
guments on this problem in Hickman v Boffman (1808) in the
state court of appeals where he represented a person holding such
a warrant. Despite defendant's reliance upon prior settlement a
long while earlier, as confirmed by the county court, Clay suc-
cessfully contended that a military warrant on federal authority
must prevail. As he put it, a military warrant was "of a higher
dignity in law" than local certificates of settlement alone.17
In the future he liked to tell the story that after beginning
practice with no money, he had hoped to earn a hundred pounds
the first year, but that he surpassed that goal decidedly.18 Consid-
ering his legal education, his social connections, including his
favorable marriage into the Hart family, and especially his abil-
ity and energy in specializing in these land-title cases, one has to
conclude his sizeable financial returns were no surprise.
His pattern in taking a case was to ask for compensation
with a portion of the land involved in it, and often the amount
depended upon the outcome. By such an agreement with
Alexander Black he received 1050 acres along the Licking River.
He got a fourth of a tract he recovered in a suit for Thomas
Donnell and the same in another for Michael Stoner. His corre-
spondence reflects many similar arrangements.19
As a result, within a few years he held a great deal of prop-
erty. His tax bill for 1808 listed about ten thousand acres, four-
teen slaves, and forty horses.20 In addition, he acquired numerous
town lots and buildings, one of them a hotel in Lexington. He
erected his comfortable Mill Street residence and a neighboring
law office.21 Soon he acquired an estate, known as Ashland, south
of town and started a dignified dwelling there. No wonder his
brother-in-law James Brown wrote: "On all hands it seems agreed
by such of your countrymen as visit us [in New Orleans] that
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you are at the head of your profession, and are rapidly growing
rich—Indeed some accounts assure us that you are acquiring
money 'as fast as you can count it.' All that I infer from this is
that you are doing extremely well for I have long been sensible
that the public rumors respecting purses of lawyers were, like
most other reports, subject to great exaggeration."22
Clay was very impressive before a jury. Six-feet tall and thin,
he moved gracefully about the courtroom. He was a striking fig-
ure, holding the complete attention of spectators. His voice trav-
eled from a slow, subdued delivery that connected him to his
audience, and then he advanced his case, with his low key alter-
nating with sharp emphasis. At first organlike, his tone deeply
affected everyone present. Nearing the close, he punctuated his
conclusion with great spirit. And more often than not, he got his
verdict. Some people compared him to Patrick Henry, who was
also a native Virginian. In truth, Clay's silver-smooth diction as
well as emotional impact did resemble that of the great Revolu-
tionary patriot.
He did not take as many criminal cases as those in other
branches of law. He was adequately prepared but not a specialist
in this area of jurisprudence. Still, he was a formidable trial law-
yer because of his attractive style and moving eloquence, enabling
him to give sway to interesting innovations. Information on these
cases is not as full as those on questions of property, which were
more likely to be appealed and reported in published volumes.
One thing is clear: he seldom lost a criminal case.
A sensational trial involved Doshey Phelps, who became so
irritated in a domestic quarrel with her sister-in-law that she shot
her dead. It appeared to be an obvious murder, but Clay got a
verdict of temporary insanity—he called it a "delirium"—which
made the act punishable as manslaughter and allowed a penalty
of only a few years of imprisonment. This lenient disposition of
the case may have been due as much to the husband's forgiving
his wife, the killer of his sister, as to Clay's argument.23
A similar instance was the murder trial of a man and his son,
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whom people in Lexington called "the two Germans." Here, too,
there was no doubt the defendants had killed the victim. Clay
again obtained a lesser verdict of manslaughter, followed up with
a plea for an arrest of judgment, discharging the prisoner. The
lawyer could often win popular sympathy for his clients, in this
instance probably helped along by the presence of a distraught
wife and mother in the courtroom. She overwhelmed him with
gratitude after adjournment.24
Perhaps the most incredible outcome of a murder trial, again
with Clay for the defense, concerned a certain Willis. Though the
evidence was strong, the jury had divided, causing a new trial.
Now Clay contended that this amounted to inflicting double jeop-
ardy on the prisoner, whereupon the judge told him he could not
assume that ground. Very irritated, the attorney refused to con-
tinue the case and walked out, which seemed to rattle the judge
into sending him a message, now allowing the argument. The
jury was quite affected by these strange proceedings and came
out with a verdict of not guilty. Clay had indulged in question-
able reasoning on double jeopardy, the judge had been unjusti-
fied in cutting him off so abruptly, and the jury was altogether
distracted. At any rate, Willis was free. His conduct does not
seem to have improved, and Clay recognized it when he met the
young man on the street one day, boasting of his good fortune.
According to an early account, he said, "Here comes Mr. Clay,
who saved my life." Clay countered, "Ah Willis, poor fellow, I
fear I have saved too many like you who ought to be hanged."25
Old sources claim that Clay never lost a capital case, but a
modern historian disagrees. One of his defendants, Henry Field,
was convicted of killing his wife and was hanged. Later his slave
confessed to the deed. The slave's confession may have been
forced, but this exception to Clay's supposed perfect record had
a sad outcome for poor Field.26
In a rare instance when he served as a prosecutor, in the trial
of a slave who was hanged for killing a brutal overseer, he gained
a conviction. Clay had argued that a slave must humbly endure
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even such a severe correction. Looking back on the circumstances,
he told a friend he regretted the execution "more than any other
act of his professional career."27
In this period Clay generated wide visibility as a lawyer by
defending Aaron Burr in one of the nation's best-known criminal
cases. He participated only in the early stage of proceedings that
would move from a lower court in Kentucky to a spectacular
treason trial, heard by Chief Justice Marshall in the East. As a
political as well as legal question, the prosecution of this gifted
but highly controversial figure began a long-standing debate about
what Burr had actually done and how he ought to have been
treated at law.28
Grandson of the famous minister Jonathan Edwards, veteran
officer of the Revolutionary army, consummate New York poli-
tician, and Republican vice president, Burr had killed Alexander
Hamilton in a duel and had been effectively neutralized at the
capital by his rival, President Jefferson, and other party leaders.
After leaving office in spring 1805, Burr set out for the West in
search of some enterprise to recoup his former prominence. Pro-
ceeding down the Ohio and Mississippi, he encountered an en-
thusiastic welcome wherever he stopped. Clay in Lexington,
William Henry Harrison in Cincinnati, Andrew Jackson in Nash-
ville, governors, senators, and other notables reflected these warm
popular feelings. On a privately owned island in the river off
Marietta, Ohio, a well-to-do Irish immigrant, Harman Blenner-
hassett, was enchanted by the great man and soon began a project
of helping him with money, recruits, boats, and guns, all to sup-
port American colonization in Louisiana along the disputed bor-
der of Spanish Texas, it was said. This so-called Bastrop grant
would be useful to territorial expansionists, should war with Spain
break out. Would that also verify the periodic hint of western
secession from the Union? The person who might assure success
of the scheme was the unprincipled governor of the Louisiana
Territory, the commanding general of the army there, James
Wilkinson, with whom Burr was in frequent contact.29
During the next summer of 1806, Burr returned to the West
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to move ahead on some plan or other. Exactly what, was unclear.
In Kentucky, Burr's critics, mostly confirmed Federalists, did not
doubt his intention: it was, they declared, to lead an unpatriotic,
treasonable secession of the transmontane states, linked to sub-
jugation of Spanish territory as the future realm of this egocen-
tric filibuster.
Such was the view of Joseph Hamilton Daveiss (he assumed
the middle name in memory of Burr's victim, the party's saint). A
Federalist appointee as United States district attorney for Ken-
tucky, who was another brother-in-law of John Marshall and an
associate of Clay's inveterate opponent Humphrey Marshall,
Daveiss smelled a rat. As soon as Burr arrived in 1805, the attor-
ney had begun to send President Jefferson long, alarmed letters,
warning that Burr in league with General Wilkinson was con-
spiring to detach the western states from the Union. Spain would
continue to supply funds to Wilkinson, he predicted, as it had to
other subversives. Without reserve, Daveiss suspected more per-
sons linked to some such plan: Senators John Breckinridge and
John Adair of Kentucky, John Smith of Ohio, General William
Henry Harrison, even Clay. Months passed from January 1806
onward without any acknowledgment from Jefferson, who,
Daveiss felt, was uncooperative in taking action against this peril
because the chief executive and he were of different party per-
suasions.30 At last, he resorted to the United States Circuit Court,
whose presiding judge, Harry Innes, was another person Daveiss
had mentioned as a malefactor. That Innes belonged to this net-
work seemed to him authenticated by a close friendship with Clay.
Now the district attorney moved ahead without Jefferson's
approval. In early November 1806, he presented a motion to
Judge Innes for the apprehension of Burr, to be questioned for
violating an American law prohibiting civilian attacks upon a
foreign country with whom this nation was at peace. He care-
fully avoided charging Burr with treason, a constitutionally de-
fined act of war by Americans against the United States, for that
would have been more difficult to prove.31 Predictably, the judge
preferred to move more slowly and ruled he did not have the
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power to require Burr to submit to questioning without prior
action by a grand jury. Though Burr did so appear on his own
volition, Innes still insisted upon a grand-jury finding, which
Daveiss could not get because a key witness, Senator John Adair,
was not available. For the time being the district attorney was
checked. Clay visited the courtroom in Frankfort during these
proceedings, then joined a crowd on the street celebrating the
outcome.32
Daveiss returned to the task the first week in December 1806
by again filing a motion before Innes for a grand jury. Now he
would face Clay as one of the defense counsel. Burr had urgently
requested this representation because he enjoyed Clay's declared
sympathy for him as a sufferer of political persecution. But the
lawyer hesitated. One complication was his temporary appoint-
ment to fill out a term in the Senate in Washington, to which
Burr, knowledgeable about congressional business, answered that
Congress would not transact any important business until the
new year. So there was no hurry to get to the capital.33 The other
point causing Clay's pause was a need for Burr's absolute assur-
ance that he was innocent of these charges. Right off, he got a
written answer. Burr had no design to separate the western states
from the Union, he wrote. Furthermore, "I do not own a musket
nor a bayonet, nor any article of military stores, nor does any
person for me, by my authority or with my knowledge." He con-
cluded by declaring he had explained his plans to "the principal
officers of the government, and I believe are well understood by
the administration [headed by Jefferson] and seen by it with com-
placency. They are such as every man must approve."34 A stretch
of the truth, but it was enough to obtain Clay's agreement to
take the case.
At a second hearing in early December, Clay emphasized his
belief in Burr's innocence. As defense counsel, he assured the court
he "cared not in what attitude he should be considered as stand-
ing; but he would instantly renounce Col. Burr and his cause, did
he entertain the slightest idea of his guilt, as to the charges exhib-
ited against him by Mr. Daveiss." And to affirm his principled
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representation of the controversial defendant, he refused any
compensation from Burr. In extravagant phrases Clay declared,
"You have heard of inquisitions in Europe, you have heard of the
screws and tortures made use of in the dens of despotism, to
extort confession; of the dark conclaves and caucuses for the
purpose of twisting some incoherent expression into evidence of
guilt. Is not the project of the attorney for the United States, a
similar object of the error?"35
A heated exchange between Clay and Daveiss occurred when
the district attorney offered to assist the grand jury in examining
witnesses. Clay complained that this altogether novel procedure
would transform the grand jury into a trial jury at the expense of
justice. Judge Innes ruled against the request, but surprisingly
Burr himself consented to a presentation of written questions for
possible use by the panel.36 The only significance of this dispute
was to feed animosity between the opposing lawyers in the days
ahead. Still, it was an interesting issue of defendants' rights.37
Among several others, Kentucky's ex-Senator John Adair, a
crony of General Wilkinson, finally appeared before the panel
but with no evidence to cause it to indict. The prosecutor was
especially disappointed when the editors of the Frankfort West-
ern World, which had been sounding the alarm against Burr for
a long while, reneged by saying they had no firsthand knowledge
of illegal acts. So the grand jury decided it had no true bill, much
to Clay's satisfaction. Public opinion in Frankfort seemed to share
that feeling, reflected by enthusiastic applause around the capi-
tol and a gala ball that evening.38
Such was not the view of President Jefferson in Washington.
During the hearings in Kentucky he had received reports he
thought incriminated Burr. The principal allegation came from
Wilkinson, till now Burr's collaborator, who produced Burr's
coded letters, outlining a plan to attack Spanish Mexico and to
seize New Orleans as a base. Though this would be a misde-
meanor, a violation of federal law, and might indicate constitu-
tionally treasonable behavior as well, the authenticity of the
documents Wilkinson produced was questionable. Certainly he
30 Henry Clay the Lawyer
was a slippery informant and, in fact, he had doctored the text.39
Nevertheless, hostile to Burr as Jefferson was, the chief executive
believed what he read. Forthwith, he circulated a proclamation
to the country, warning of serious danger and stopping move-
ment of Burr's men and equipment down the Mississippi.40
The proclamation came out on November 27,1806, between
the two hearings in Kentucky. Clay did not know about it then
or before he set out for Washington to attend the Senate. When
he arrived, he called upon the president, who showed him the
Wilkinson papers. Jefferson had no doubt that Burr intended to
invade Spanish provinces and detach western states as parts of a
grand empire. The young senator immediately changed his mind
about Burr's plans, entirely illegal in his opinion. "We have been
much mistaken about Burr," he concluded. "When I left Ken-
tucky, I believed him both an innocent and persecuted man." On
the contrary, he said, Burr "had formed the no less daring projects
than to reduce New Orleans, subjugate Mexico, and divide the
Union."41 Thereafter, Clay never changed his mind about this
episode. Why he reversed his views so completely is difficult to
understand. One can believe that his strong attachment to
Jefferson and the Republican party had much to do with it.
Whatever Burr hoped to accomplish now collapsed.
Wilkinson had decided he preferred to retain his subsidy from
Spain instead of cooperating with Burr. This meant he would not
incite a border conflict, upon which his former partner's opera-
tion had depended. And the general's exaggerated warnings fu-
eled excessive official reactions. At Blennerhassett's island a small
band of Burr's followers fled down the river, as militia from the
neighborhood occupied and plundered their camp. This episode
provided authorities a questionable justification to charge Burr
with levying war against the United States, that is to say, procur-
ing treasonous conduct of about twenty untrained recruits. Burr
himself was arrested in Louisiana, then escorted overland to Rich-
mond for trial in the federal circuit court, Chief Justice Marshall
presiding.
Through summer 1807 prosecutors pressed the case ardently,
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while Jefferson supervised strategy by his letters from Washing-
ton, which displayed partisan animosity against the defendant.
At the trial, Marshall's rulings turned out to be a detailed formu-
lation of the law of treason. He emphasized a strict constitu-
tional definition of treason as actually levying war against the
United States by an assembled force. If that were proven, then a
person procuring the treason from a distance would also be guilty.
But Burr's counsel could prevail in successfully contending that
the few men on Blennerhassett's island were merely making their
way peacefully to a projected colony in the Bastrop tract. That
may well have been the option that their leader had in mind,
lacking action along the Spanish borderland by the United States
army that Wilkinson had promised and then abandoned. Fol-
lowing the chief justice's instructions on the law, the jury found
Burr not guilty on the facts.
Clay was unpersuaded. Though thinking Burr innocent when
he had served as defense counsel, he now firmly believed him
guilty and meriting punishment. He said so when Attorney Gen-
eral Caesar Rodney asked him to prosecute Burr in an Ohio mis-
demeanor case, involving the charge of illegal plans to invade
Spanish territory. He declined to represent either side with the
excuse he did not have the time to do so. Besides, he thought
taking the assignment would leave the impression that he was
using information he had gained from Burr when he had repre-
sented him in the Kentucky hearing.42 Nevertheless, he had con-
cluded Burr was guilty.
Clay did feel sympathy for Harman Blennerhassett, who suf-
fered even after escaping a treason conviction. The Irishman had
contributed extensive financial support of the operation for re-
cruits, boats, and other supplies. Burr's wealthy son-in-law Jo-
seph Alston had provided more. Much of their contributions
consisted of lending their credit to Burr by endorsing his bills.
Alas, he played the scoundrel by overcommitting this resource,
misrepresenting its use, finally absconding to Europe, showing
personal traits for which he was notorious. Poor Blennerhassett
ended up in debtors' prison for a time. In the months after the
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Richmond treason trial ended, Blennerhassett retained Clay to
help him handle claims of creditors, who eventually took over
the Ohio River island estate, his slaves, and other property.43 It
was a bitter experience for this gullible admirer of Aaron Burr.
The first phase of Clay's legal practice, which had begun with
admission to the Kentucky bar, ended in 1811 when he became
heavily involved in national politics. He then had to turn over
most of his business to his friend Robert Wickliffe, who offered
to handle some suits without remuneration but did accept large
fees from a number of pending cases.44
Looking back, one can see that Clay had now built a reputa-
tion as a very active, effective lawyer. For example, a random
selection of thirty of his cases in the Fayette County Court in a
four-year period showed he lost only one.45 His specialties had
been debt collections and land disputes, both concerning impor-
tant economic interests of that part of the country, about which
Clay was well informed. A lesser involvement was criminal law
where his learning was minimal, but his eloquence and style gained
him huge success.
Contemporaries viewed Clay's professional ability more posi-
tively than historians often have. His clients and associates could
point to his large financial gains in land-title litigation as proof
of his mastery of that field. The general public was much af-
fected by his eloquence and persuasive reasoning in a courtroom.
Judges and other attorneys might have some reservations, how-
ever, about his depth if an issue required argument drawing upon
complex doctrines of jurisprudence. Some biographers have so
portrayed him.46 Clay himself contributed to that view by often
expressing his regret in not applying himself more seriously to
the study of law in his early years. Actually, his preparation un-
der Wythe and Brooke, as well as his contacts with gifted per-
sons of bar and bench in Richmond, placed him well above
average for his day.
At any rate, the forums in which he practiced often did not
demand sophisticated presentations. The county courts of Ken-
tucky were each composed of a hard-pressed circuit judge and
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two lay judges, who could be influenced by emphasis upon simple
common-law principles, even just common sense, more than high-
level legal discourse. A study of reports of state appellate and
federal Supreme Court cases indicates it was also true there.
Nevertheless, Clay had a respectable proficiency in general
fields of law. Soon after arrival in Lexington he was appointed
professor of law and politics at Transylvania University, a post
he held for a few years. Other academic and professional rela-
tions with the institution continued a long while. He served as a
trustee, taking an interest in its affairs, one of which was its in-
volvement in recurrent litigation about the university's claims to
land, granted by Virginia for its establishment before Kentucky
statehood.47
After 1804, as a member of the state legislature, he made a
determined effort to get a new federal district court for the three
states of Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio. He pushed through a
resolution to ask representatives and senators in Congress to press
for that reform of a system in which western states lacked ad-
equate access to circuit tribunals. The overworked district judge
in each of the three states had also to hear circuit cases. Then
when Clay went to Washington to serve as a senator in 1807, he
became a member of the Judiciary Committee and drafted a bill
for change. It passed Congress as proposed. A new seventh cir-
cuit was created, with an added United States Supreme Court
justice who would also preside over cases in it by travel to each
state and receive help from the district judges. The young senator
justly took pride in this legislation.48
Clay contributed also to improvements of Kentucky's legal
institutions. He was much involved in reforming the structure of
the county courts, to which he traveled regularly during the pe-
riod of primitive roads and inns, thus drawing from that arduous
experience. He helped revise the state's criminal code, perhaps
involving less of his own expertise.49 But he did not approve a
movement then underway across the country to prohibit cita-
tions to English common-law cases and commentaries after Ameri-
can independence in 1776. In fact, in an argument before the
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appellate court he sought to defy a new state law providing that
prohibition, but was overruled.50
On one legal subject he made no progress and displayed an
alarmist feeling, derived from the nation's politics. He shared with
fellow Jeffersonian Republicans a dissatisfaction with the increas-
ingly nationalistic decisions of Federalist Supreme Court justices.
The development of judicial review in Marbury v Madison (1803)
and other cases disturbed him. He urged adoption of a constitu-
tional amendment "limiting the powers of the F[e]deral Judiciary
to the enforcement of the laws of the U[nited] States." This would
forbid jurisdiction over questions about the dividing line between
state and national powers. He spiritedly remarked that "unless
the amendment contemplated does take place, a dissolution of
the union must be the ultimate consequence. Two independent
Judiciaries, neither acknowledging the superiority of the other,
may for a time subsist without inconvenience, but in the end they
will come into collision, and the concussion which they will pro-
duce must destroy one or the other government." Years later,
how differently he would see the problem of federalism, of divid-
ing state and national powers during controversies about states'
rights, the Union, and the Constitution.51
In a legal career from his admission to the Kentucky bar as a
young arrival from Virginia in 1797 in the bustling western town
of Lexington until he left for the congressional session of 1811 in
Washington, Clay had gained a very favorable professional repu-
tation. To be sure, this was not surprising in light of his good
fortune to study under the tutelage of Chancellor Wythe and the
experienced state Attorney General Robert Brooke back in Rich-
mond. His natural gifts of keen intellect and striking personality
had also prepared him for decided success as a lawyer. Income
from ample fees soon made him a person of extensive means.
Added to this was his early reputation as one of the state's ablest
politicians, a familiar asset for a successful law practice in those
days. Within a short time, he had gained a position of leadership
of the state's Jeffersonian Republican party.
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A specialty at this stage was collection of debts in the West,
drawing him into profitable relations with merchants in eastern
cities. It was then a well-known pattern across the country for
young attorneys, such as Clay in Kentucky and Daniel Webster
in New Hampshire, to handle this kind of business.
Frequent clients were free-wheeling speculators or other claim-
ants for broad areas of western lands. An example was the batch
of cases involving the interests of Chief Justice Marshall's rela-
tives. Clay lost some of this litigation, including those he ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court during his first appearance there.
Often he was handsomely rewarded—in many instances he
worked on a contingent basis, paid with large pieces of land or
other property if he gained a favorable decision. He encountered
quite complicated questions of titles because of careless policies
of Virginia in its wholesale grants of tracts in Kentucky before
detaching it as a new state. Though the well-known case of Green
v Biddle (1823) in the Supreme Court had broader constitutional
implications, it arose out of these tangled circumstances.
Clay's extensive practice as a lawyer in land cases would pro-
vide him with a useful base for long involvement with national
land policies as a politician. Through the Jacksonian period of
the 1820s into the forties, he was a leading figure in discussing
important subjects such as preemption rights for settlers in the
public domain, which he opposed, and distribution of federal
revenue to the states from land sales as a fund for internal im-
provements, which he advocated tirelessly. He spoke about these
issues with assurance.
He did take a few criminal cases, though with some reliance
upon his oratory and personal effectiveness to sway juries or to
influence judges to hand down less severe rulings than prosecu-
tors reasonably expected. In defending clients charged with mur-
der he saved the lives of a good number and got them off with
verdicts of innocence or manslaughter instead of the death pen-
alty, which the facts and the law seemed to command.
Undoubtedly, his most controversial criminal case was his
defense of Aaron Burr, accused of treason. It addressed the ques-
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tion of how to define that crime more specifically than the
Constitution's language, which referred to waging war and lead-
ing an assembly of force against the United States. Though Clay
was not involved in the judicial hearing before Marshall's federal
circuit court in Virginia which decided the case, he was involved
earlier before the circuit court in Kentucky. Burr was then wan-
dering about in the West, stirring suspicion that he was organiz-
ing an armed secession from the Union.
In the first part of this story, Clay had joined many Republi-
cans in an enthusiastic welcome of a prominent figure in their
party. So it was no surprise that he rejected any notion that Burr
was intending to disrupt the Union in a military operation. Not
only sharing a widespread sentiment favorable to the former vice
president, as a lawyer Clay unhesitatingly agreed to represent
Burr before the federal circuit court in Frankfort. He ought to
have recalled Burr's slippery past before accommodating him.
Nevertheless, he conducted Burr's defense with ability. The op-
posing counsel was every bit as politically biased against Burr as
Clay was for him. Anyway, Clay did argue on good grounds
against the district attorney's arbitrary strategy in questioning
witnesses before the grand jury. As a lawyer, he handled himself
well, though later historians have not paid much attention to this
preliminary chapter in their accounts of Burr's "conspiracy."
ECONOMIC ISSUES
X o r ten years during and after the War of 1812 while Clay di-
rected his attention to political affairs, his law practice was inac-
tive. Then in the early twenties he encountered worrisome financial
trouble, partly involving his endorsements on defaulted notes of
friends and relatives. Like many lawyer-politicians of the day, he
went into court in search of a better income from fees. Until he
became President John Quincy Adams's secretary of state (1825-
29), he carried on a brisk business in cases reflecting governmental
economic policies, notably on land and banking.
Although the postwar years were a time of optimism, of na-
tionalism and expansion in some respects, there was an opposing
current of localism, of disturbing maladjustments. People in the
West blamed a spreading depression upon banking abuses, an
unbalanced foreign commerce, and exploitation by eastern inter-
ests. Opinion about remedies varied widely. In Kentucky, for ex-
ample, the branches of the newly chartered Bank of the United
States had supposedly inflicted hardship on farmers and mer-
chants. Debtors in growing numbers sought relief at the state
capital by legislative moratoria on their obligations. Critics often
pointed to lawyers for their legal manipulations and especially to
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the Supreme Court for its sweeping exercise of judicial review,
frequently nourishing national power at the states' expense.1
One of Clay's cases arising out of these conditions was Green
v Biddle (1823). It originated in Kentucky's effort to protect set-
tlers on land claimed by Virginians. Many of these claimants had
obtained warrants granted by the Old Dominion before detach-
ment of Kentucky as a new state in 1792. It was an unrestrained,
wholesale process in which a buyer could sometimes get a hun-
dred acres for two dollars. The location was uncertain, bounded
by trees and creeks, plotted on rudimentary sketches or none at
all. It was clear many of the claims had not been perfected by
settlement or sale by the grantees. And worst of all, the tracts
were often occupied by Kentuckians, who might have no recorded
title at the land office in Frankfort.2
To protect these occupants from aggressive claimants, the
state legislature sought to ensure their past investment of labor
and capital if they were evicted. In 1797 it enacted one of a series
of laws, providing that claimants had to compensate occupants
for their improvements and could not collect any retroactive rent
from them. Another measure in 1812 stipulated that these im-
provements need not have been valuable or permanent. In ad-
ministering the policy, Kentucky judges inclined to rule for
occupants generously. Such laws as these were being adopted else-
where in the country. They departed from English common law,
which had classified all unauthorized improvements as "waste"
not eligible for compensation.3
The key element in a mounting controversy was a "compact,"
stipulated by Virginia and accepted by Kentucky in 1789 before
gaining statehood: "All private rights and interests of land within
the said district [Kentucky], derived from the laws of Virginia
prior to such separation, shall remain valid and secure under the
laws of the proposed State, and shall be determined by the laws
now existing in this State."4
Disagreement of the two states intensified in early 1821 when
heirs of a Virginia claimant, John Green, filed suit in the federal
circuit court against a Kentuckian, Richard Biddle, at least nomi-
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nally in possession of a piece of land and therefore having stand-
ing as an occupant.5 Probably, the real opponents were promi-
nent speculators and developers on both sides. For example, the
Marshall families were quite interested in the outcome.6 The two
circuit judges divided in opinion on the questions, and an appeal
went to the Supreme Court in Washington on the issue of consti-
tutionality of the occupant laws at its term that winter. A deci-
sion there favored Green of Virginia, but as an amicus curiae,
Clay came into the chamber and successfully moved for a rehear-
ing because Biddle of Kentucky had not had counsel for argu-
ment of the case.7
In Frankfort the legislature took another step to vindicate
the state's position. In December 1821 it appointed Clay and
George Bibb commissioners to go to Richmond and obtain a
negotiated settlement. Upon their arrival there a few weeks later,
Clay addressed the legislature with a defense of Kentucky's policy
and with proposals for an agreement. It was an eloquent speech
with moving recollections of a fond native son, confident of
Virginia's sense of justice. He cited early instances in which Vir-
ginia itself adopted the same sort of regulations protecting im-
provements as those presently in question. He proposed two
options to end the dispute: accept Kentucky's very fair measures
requiring claimants to compensate ousted occupants for their
improvements of the land, or establish a bilateral commission to
determine a solution. In fact, he contended, the compact of 1789,
on which Virginia now asserted its rights, had called for such a
commission. This clause might forestall the Supreme Court's de-
ciding the case.8
In March 1822 Virginia rejected both of Clay's options on
the ground that the dispute had to be decided by a judicial body
instead of his version of a commission. No wonder, because it
appeared the Supreme Court would uphold Virginia's position
again. It heard reargument of Green by counsel (including Clay)
but postponed a decision until next term.9
Still hoping to prevail, Clay got the Kentucky legislature to
authorize him to work with an appointee from Virginia to set
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guidelines for a board of six neutral judges who would make
binding decisions. First, these rules had to be approved by the
two legislatures. In June he and Benjamin Watkins Leigh, his coun-
terpart and reliable friend, completed their plan. It provided that
the board decide the validity of unlocated land warrants. The
state of Virginia must guarantee that it would indemnify Ken-
tucky if any of its individual claimants failed to comply with
rulings by the board against them. Kentucky predictably approved
the guidelines in November 1822.
Not so, Virginia. Its rejection, however, was a very close call.
The lower chamber of representatives approved, and then the
senate disapproved by the thinnest margin. Clay was extremely
upset by its opposition to the convention's provision that Vir-
ginia guarantee payments by stubborn claimants. When asked if
he would withdraw this provision, he spiritedly answered that a
guarantee of compliance with the board's rulings was essential.
Why enter an agreement yet reserve the power to withdraw if
disappointed in the outcome?10 Nevertheless, though he regret-
ted the result of the "business between our respective states," he
would not "dwell upon it, especially as it has probably termi-
nated finally, and had therefore better be forgotten as soon as it
can be."11
Clay's only hope for success, slim though it was, now de-
pended upon reargument of the Green case, which he immedi-
ately undertook. He had to combat somehow the postponed but
adverse opinion of 1821 a year earlier by Justice Joseph Story,
who had said it was unanimous with six of the seven justices
"present." That seems to have been a misleading comment, for
in both hearings Chief Justice Marshall did not record a vote, no
doubt because his relatives had a large interest in Kentucky lands.12
Furthermore, William Johnson would soon make it clear he did
not agree with Story. And Thomas Todd of Kentucky, though
also silent, would not disapprove his state's policy. So no more
than four or perhaps three instead of six among the seven judges
could be counted upon to approve Virginia's position. Still, Clay
himself could not be confident of recruiting a majority of four
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for Kentucky. Much depended upon which way the absent
Bushrod Washington would go after this second hearing.
Story's opinion in the first hearing had chiefly rested on his
application of a common-law principle that rights and titles to
land must be determined by the state making the grant, Virginia
in this instance. Surprisingly, he had not even mentioned the con-
tract clause of the Constitution, which prohibits states from im-
pairing the obligation of contracts (article 1, section 10). Perhaps
he uncharacteristically did not because Virginia's counsel had not.
Both they and Story did refer to the compact of 1789 between
the two states, providing for a bilateral commission to settle dis-
putes, but did not point out that no commission had sat. Story
had concluded that the Kentucky laws were unconstitutional, the
question submitted by the two divided judges of the lower court;
yet he did not identify what part of the Constitution supplied his
authority.13
During reargument in March 1822, Clay's opponents did not
make these mistakes, for they did cite the contract clause as the
constitutional basis in their case. Thus the compact of 1789 was
a contract to which the two states were parties, one of whom
(Kentucky) had impaired its obligation.14
Clay replied that the compact itself was an unconstitutional
restraint on Kentucky's power to govern its internal affairs, a
states' rights position quite familiar then and in the future. He
also contended that since the Constitution (article 1, section 9)
required congressional approval of interstate pacts and since the
national legislature had not done so specifically in the law admit-
ting Kentucky to the Union, Virginia's reservation on controlling
land warrants in the compact was inoperative. He repelled the
assertion that Congress had implicitly approved that provision
when it admitted Kentucky. But his best point charged Virginia
itself with not observing the compact of 1789, since it had not
joined Kentucky in establishing a commission to find an ami-
cable compromise. He had in mind, of course, the action of the
Virginia legislature opposing the procedures he himself had put
forward in the negotiations.
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Until now the contract clause had been invoked in this court
to protect only private parties against a state. Yet Clay did not
attack the legal novelty of interpreting it as a restraint upon an
agreement between two states. That dimension would subse-
quently be seen as the most significant innovation of the case and
would have been a better target for Clay to attack in Green.15
Now he moved to a philosophical plea: "This Court is not a
mere court of justice applying ordinary laws. It is a political tri-
bunal, and may look to political considerations and consequences.
If there be doubt, ought the settled policy of a State, and its rules
of property, to be disturbed? . . .  The [Kentucky] laws now in
question are founded upon the great laws of nature, which secure
the right resulting from occupation and bodily labour. The laws of
society are but modifications of that superior law. . . . Surely this
Court will respect those rules of property which had their origin in
early colonial times, which were adopted by the parent State and
have been so long acquiesced in and confirmed by inveterate habit
and usage among the people where they prevail."16
Clay's argument was strong when he emphasized the failure
of Virginia to approve a commission of the two states to deter-
mine a fair solution of this dispute, as provided in the Constitu-
tion. Yet he did not react vigorously enough to Virginia counsel's
reliance upon the contract clause, for that new dimension de-
served a more credible explanation by justices and lawyers than
it received. And the Kentuckian's position was even weaker when
he emphasized an extensive sovereign power of Kentucky to
thwart federal intervention of this sort. He was reflecting angry
opinion prevalent back home in the style of a vocal states' righter,
and seemed inconsistent with his well-known nationalism. Fur-
thermore, his appeal to natural law as a restraint upon a state
was a gloss upon the Constitution, which can be found nowhere
in that document. Yet in this period, judges and lawyers often
drew upon this philosophical principle of a higher law to affect
decision making.
A year after this second argument, on February 27, 1823,
the court announced its decision. Justice Bushrod Washington,
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who had been absent at the first hearing, delivered a long opin-
ion invalidating the Kentucky occupant-land law. Again there
was a weak attempt to show a judicial solidarity. But of the seven
justices, Marshall, Todd, and Brockholst Livingston did not par-
ticipate; and Johnson produced a separate opinion, which appar-
ently was concurring but really dissenting. The effect was to reveal
the court deciding a novel and important constitutional question
by a three-to-one division, lacking a majority of the whole bench
of seven.
Washington reiterated Story's previous discussion of com-
mon-law principles which, he ruled, supported Virginia's policy.
Then he rejected Clay's view that Congress had never approved a
specific provision for an interstate commission on land disputes
and therefore had not approved the terms of the compact of 1789
about claimants in general. On the contrary, the justice believed
that Congress had implicitly sanctioned that procedure when it
passed the law as a whole admitting Kentucky as a state.
Unlike Story and unlike Clay, Washington paid attention to
the contract clause, prohibiting state impairment of obligations.
He could draw upon the reasoning of Virginia's counsel but not
upon any prior interpretation by this court of these few words of
the Constitution to settle the present issue. Whether justified or
not, the result was to open intensive debate about the soundness
and the desirability of the Supreme Court's disposition of Green
v Biddle.u
Criticism began with Justice Johnson's strange opinion. He
was quite dissatisfied with Washington's position, which, he be-
lieved, dangerously impinged upon state power. Though he would
not uphold the claim of Clay's client, Biddle, he would return the
case to the lower court which first tried it. And he would leave
such questions to a state tribunal since the subject matter re-
quired it. The problem with his wanderings was that the case
had come up on a division of two federal circuit, not state, judges
who had certified they could not agree, and they probably would
not have agreed if the case had been "returned" to them. Con-
trary to intimations from Story and Washington, Johnson cer-
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tainly did not fully concur with others for a unanimous disposi-
tion of the issues, not to mention those who were silent.18
Kentucky strongly complained about the judicial blow. In
his message to the legislature, Governor John Adair attacked the
court for wrongly favoring Virginia, which had refused to settle
the controversy amicably before a neutral commission, as pro-
vided in the compact of 1789. And a minority of the justices, he
said, had erroneously applied that document as a contract be-
tween two states in constitutional terms to invalidate the occu-
pant laws. What would follow? Would the national government
employ its superior force to implement the decision? If it did, he
darkly predicted, there would be "an event of all others to be
deprecated."19
An aroused legislature adopted firm resolutions, addressed
to Congress. To avoid "the degradation and oppression" of the
court's opinion, they called for a guarantee of "coequal sover-
eignty with the STATES which compose this union." Even
Humphrey Marshall, the veteran Federalist member of that body
and Chief Justice John Marshall's brother-in-law, voted for these
resolutions, probably because of the impact of the case upon his
own extensive land holdings.20
Despite understandable dissatisfaction with the decision in
Green, Clay urged the governor and legislators to avoid extreme
reaction. He had a "warm conversation" with Governor Adair,
whose message he called "ill advised." He predicted nothing more
extravagant from the legislature than a few intemperate para-
graphs in its resolutions. "The mouth and the pen are happy
conductors to let off bad humors. Not that I do not really think
that we have much justly to complain of in respect to the fate of
our occupying claimant laws. But then I do not think that we
ought to make any Civil War about them."21
One feature of the case, which Clay as well as many others
thought especially objectionable, was the three-to-one division
of justices. On such an important question as this, he believed a
majority of the whole court of seven was essential.22 Occasion-
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ally, his dissatisfaction led him to severe comment, such as his
remark that the justices were "superannuated."23
More often, he aimed his criticism at Virginia. He empha-
sized its present inconsistency with its frequent skirmishes over
judicial review at the expense of its sovereignty. Earlier, that state
had emphatically disagreed with the Supreme Court's assertion
of jurisdiction superior to that of its tribunals in the Cohens case
concerning constitutionality of a congressional lottery law. But
when Virginia wanted help on the land-occupancy question, it
welcomed federal intervention.24
Despite his dissatisfaction with the court's handling of the
present problem, Clay maintained his belief that judicial review
was a necessary institution to uphold national authority in face
of extreme states' rights. As he had once expressed it and still
believed, if a choice had to be made between state separation
from the Union and consolidation of power, he would go for
consolidation. As much as he disapproved Kentucky's debtor-
relief policies of that time, he said, "We feel in this State the want
very much [of a negative] decision of the Supreme Court on our
execution [relief] laws. We must hobble on as well as we can
until the next term."25 Unlike many critics then complaining about
judicial activism, he welcomed it on other questions.
Clay's perspective on the court's role in government and on
the Green case in particular can be understood by looking at
congressional debates at this juncture. In both chambers contro-
versy grew, as decisions invalidating state legislation were handed
down. In this context Story's opinion at the first Green hearing
in 1821 prompted Senator Richard Johnson of Kentucky to an
attack. To counter such judicial pronouncements as this, Johnson
pressed for a constitutional amendment to give the Senate appel-
late jurisdiction about the validity of state laws.26 So much for
the principle of separation of powers. In later sessions of 1823-
25, Clay resumed his seat in the House and participated in dis-
cussions of possible reforms. One would require a quorum of the
court's seven members or a certain number of them to decide
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constitutional cases. On other questions the chief justice or all
members would have to file written opinions.
Robert Letcher, a colleague in the House from Kentucky, pro-
posed that at least five of the seven must join in constitutional
decisions. Clay advocated this version. He shared some objec-
tions, expressed on the floor, to the direction the court had re-
cently taken and emphasized a faulty, dangerous image it had
acquired. Do not glorify these jurists, he warned: they were only
human with less than perfect virtue and intellect. How persua-
sive his argument was is unclear.27 At any rate, no reforms were
adopted, not even one for a badly needed expansion of the cir-
cuit court system.
In Kentucky, Green had little practical effect upon occupants
of land claimed according to its ruling. A general determination
to resist such claims seems to have been quite effective. Besides,
branches of the state government blocked the claims. Soon after
the Supreme Court's decision the legislature passed a law forbid-
ding claimants from selling occupants' land and requiring them
to carry out improvements within a year or forfeit it.28 The Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals took a large step further in a decision
holding that Green was not a binding constitutional interpreta-
tion because it was affirmed by only three of seven justices, a
minority of the court.29 Whether or not this tribunal's reasoning
was correct, it was another barrier against enforcement of the
judicial pronouncement.
Green as a restraint on Kentucky's land policy finally ex-
pired in the Supreme Court. Hawkins v Barney (1831) applied
the state's statute of limitations in order to protect occupants
who had possessed land for seven years without claims against
them. It was prima facie proof of claimant consent, said Justice
Johnson, the dissenter in Green, who appropriately delivered the
majority opinion.30
In looking back upon this complicated case, one can venture
a few generalizations. First, an obvious difficulty the characters
in the story faced was the chaotic condition of land policies of
the two states. Absent an accurate system of survey and record
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keeping, there was bound to be the kind of trouble that devel-
oped. Conflicting claims in great number would arise as the push
of the frontier and the lucrative business of development made it
difficult to devise a fair policy.
Second, when the Green case went to the Supreme Court,
the members did not have their finest hour. There were absences
and abstentions aplenty, handicapping their honors in coming
up with a decision of high quality and credibility. Furthermore,
the role of Justice Story, despite his notable learning, was no ex-
ception. He declared the Kentucky occupancy laws unconstitu-
tional without identifying what constitutional provision applied.
His reliance on common law was somewhat better, but that would
not be a reason specified in the Constitution for his opinion after
the first hearing. When there were only four of the seven mem-
bers of the court actually participating in the decision, with one
of these being Johnson, who really dissented, he based an impor-
tant precedent on a division of only three to one. This would
inflame reaction to the outcome.
Third, Justice Washington's opinion after the second hear-
ing, based on the contract clause of the Constitution, was faulty.
Not only an unprecedented interpretation of the clause, it was
inapplicable to the facts. Undoubtedly, the framers had not in-
tended the clause to apply to a contract between two states as
parties.31 Aside from whether he should have used the question-
able original-intent standard of interpretation, the circumstances
of Kentucky's detachment from Virginia would have been more
appropriately classed a compact than a contract. The Constitu-
tion does refer to an interstate compact,32 but there were also
problems with that kind of relationship. Congress had not then
or ever explicitly approved the clause in the so-called compact of
1789 between the two states about land warrants, as required in
the Constitution. Nor can one believe that the legislators did so
implicitly when they adopted the law admitting Kentucky as a
state. Modern studies of this topic indicate that after Green the
constitutional compact clause, as distinguished from the contract
clause, was invariably used in interstate relations. Yet even these
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authors do not convincingly identify the Virginia-Kentucky agree-
ment as a compact.33
If it was a compact, then why did Virginia refuse to activate
a joint board of commissioners to arrive at a mutually satisfac-
tory, just settlement? Indeed, that is what the agreement of the
two states had provided. At any rate, that would have been a far
better precedent for future problems than the Green formula.34
Technically, the case was probably a fictitious suit involving
two parties with no genuine adversarial interests, as constitu-
tionally required. Green had title from Virginia to land in Ken-
tucky, but Biddle had only weakly alleged a real settlement of the
land in dispute. Nevertheless, many cases that that tribunal has
heard and decided over the years have been fictitious.
As for Clay's role in this litigation, it seems contrary to his
longtime interest in land policy. At this point he argued in behalf
of many squatters, occupying land without establishing a valid
title. Yet in future congressional debates Clay would vigorously
oppose a lenient national system of preemption on public lands.
Politics and a lawyer's work were not always consistent.
In this period there were other important cases involving the
contract clause and the economy that Clay argued before the
Supreme Court. A prominent one was Ogden v Saunders (1824-
27), defining the constitutional limits of state bankruptcy laws,
though it had even broader implications over the next century.
The question arose in New York where George Ogden of
that state had assigned a bill of exchange to Lewis Saunders for-
merly of Kentucky, then living in Louisiana. Ogden fell into fi-
nancial trouble, did not pay Saunders on the bill, and filed for
bankruptcy under a New York statute.35 The critical feature of
the transaction became the relative dates of Ogden's bill and this
law. The impact of the state measure of 1801 upon the debt to
Saunders in 1806 had been prospective and therefore posed an
undecided constitutional issue. If the effect of the statute upon
the debt had been retrospective, it would have been invalid un-
der a recent precedent. To complicate the circumstances, Saunders
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of Louisiana had sued the New Yorker in a federal court, gener-
ating an interstate controversy. He prevailed there, and Ogden's
heirs appealed to the Supreme Court.
Clay and two others were counsel for the appellants in a
three-day hearing of Ogden v Saunders in March 1824. Law-
yers for the other side included Daniel Webster and Henry
Wheaton (who was also the official reporter of the Court). In
urging the justices to uphold the state bankruptcy law, Clay
and his associates had to distinguish the present case from Sturges
v Crowninshield (1819), which had held that a state bankruptcy
law had unconstitutionally impaired the obligation of a prior
contract and had left the question of future contracts undecided.36
Therefore his task was to maintain state power to regulate this
future contract while his opponents would deny power over both
kinds of legislation, retrospective or prospective. Clay wished very
much to provide state relief to debtors by filling the void due to
the lack of national bankruptcy legislation, a situation he had
been seeking to change in Congress.37 As an advocate of positive
federal power generally, his lawyer's brief for this active state
policy might appear inconsistent. The same might be said of a
possible inconsistency with his current disapproval of Kentucky's
controversial debtor-relief program. But he was expressing his
belief that a sound debtor policy of individual states, in the ab-
sence of one for the whole country, was necessary for economic
growth.
As expected, he confronted strong positions of Webster and
Wheaton, counsel on the other side. They contended that the
Constitution conferred upon Congress the power to enact not
only "uniform," but also exclusive national laws on bankruptcy.
So states had no such authority, whether the legislation was pro-
spective or retrospective in relation to the date of a contract.
Indeed, they went further to insist the obligation of a contract
was derived from the universal laws of nature, immune from shift-
ing experiments with positive laws of states. No doubt with Chief
Justice Marshall in mind, they emphasized the financial disorder
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of the Confederation era when delinquent debtors got unfair help
from states. That was the condition that produced the Constitu-
tion's contract clause, they declared.38
In behalf of New York's law, Clay advanced even further
than necessary to contend that a state had full power, concurrent
with Congress, to enact either prospective or retrospective bank-
ruptcy statutes. Thus the word "uniform" did not mean exclu-
sive of state law. On a practical level, he warned, "If the Court
should pronounce the State bankrupt codes invalid, and Con-
gress should refuse to supply their place by the establishment of
uniform laws throughout the Union, the country would present
the extraordinary spectacle of a great commercial nation, with-
out laws on the subject of bankruptcy."39 Webster, who was also
working in Congress for national action, was not as pessimistic.
Several arguments by counsel moved into a theoretical zone
by defining the word "obligation" in the contract clause. As Clay
saw it, an obligation was created when a person entered a con-
tract, subject to state laws. The obligation became part of a par-
ticular contract. On the other hand, Webster connected the
obligation to a superior natural law, immune from political va-
garies.40 If that were true, however, government would be inca-
pable of exercising indispensable oversight, Clay reasoned.
The case was continued from 1824 over the next three years
to add arguments on the interstate dimension due to diversity of
state citizenship of the two parties. Did the law of one state un-
constitutionally conflict with a law of another state? Since he
was occupied with duties as secretary of state, Clay did not par-
ticipate in the second hearing.
At last, in a four-to-three division Justice Washington deliv-
ered the majority opinion. He compromised his belief in an ex-
clusive national power by upholding the New York law according
to the time of its application to an agreement. While he preserved
the Sturges precedent, prohibiting state bankruptcy intervention
on past contracts, he approved such legislation against future
contracts. In so narrowing the scope of the contract clause, the
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court broadened state jurisdiction over the important subject of
debtor relief, as Clay had wished.41
Then in a separate consideration of the question of whether
the New York law could restrain Saunders, an out-of-state citi-
zen, Justice Washington again spoke for the majority of four to
say no. He could cite as precedent only McMillan v McNeill
(1819), which had glanced at the issue in unclear language, though
it seemed to disapprove an interstate reach of the contract clause.
Justice William Johnson filed a strong opinion, agreeing there
could be no extension of a state's power beyond its own bound-
aries.42 So the present decision of Ogden in 1827 was not a re-
statement of settled doctrine but a pragmatic accommodation of
constitutional law to a developing national economy, less hin-
dered by local barriers.
Clay the lawyer lost his case for Ogden's heirs, who relied on
the invalid New York measure. It could not protect them from
Saunders of Louisiana. The question of the validity of the New
York measure could have been decided on that point alone. Clay
the politician, however, obtained a ruling on bankruptcy fitting
into his economic nationalism, reducing the scope of individual
state policies which he had just propounded as a lawyer. Still, in
his view, it remained for Congress to enact legislation to energize
the power the Court had awarded that body.
Marshall was not happy to be in a minority of three of the
seven members. Indeed it would be the only occasion during his
many years as chief justice when he did not carry his associates
with him on an important constitutional case. In an aroused opin-
ion, he budged not at all in his conviction that the contract clause
forbade any state impairment of a contractual obligation, ret-
rospectively or prospectively. He clung to his position that an
obligation derived from the law of nature, universal principles,
not state legislation. It then inhered in the contract for its en-
tirety. Typically, he worried about the peril of reverting to the
financial chaos among the states in Confederation days.43
In analyzing the Ogden case, it is relevant to recognize the
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need for some rules to assure justice to both creditors and debt-
ors. The Court provided a durable formula. Limiting the range
of debtor relief to prospective, not retrospective legislation seems
to have been the right and fair approach. If a debtor entered a
contract when a bankruptcy law was in place, he could know the
character of his obligation without risk of new conditions im-
posed by legislation. The other element of the Ogden decision
was the prohibition of one state's law extending to that of another
state, a rule essential to a nationalizing economy. Even knowledge-
able scholars have not given adequate weight to that point.
But then and later, a general disapproval of any interference
with fulfillment of financial obligations existed, so that adopting
an appropriate policy on bankruptcy was very difficult. It was
grounded on belief that release from debts was to condone viola-
tion of moral principles. Understanding that viewpoint helps ex-
plain why the country limped through the nineteenth century
without effective bankruptcy laws, particularly national but to
an extent state enactments as well.44
The standard history of debtor relief shows that New York
actually paid little attention to the Supreme Court's adverse pro-
nouncements. Indeed, for years, that state continued the same
procedure for bankruptcy as it had previously. And there were
few judicial cases there concerning the contract clause and insol-
vent debtors.45
Clay himself did not change his mind about the desirability
of some form of relief to desperate debtors. Years later, in 1840
during a severe depression, he sponsored a bill in the Senate for
that purpose. And at the next session he exploited a Whig vic-
tory in the presidential election to pass a national bankruptcy
law. In the course of urging this policy, he insisted it was un-
doubtedly constitutional, despite much misunderstanding about
its specific shape. It is interesting to note he did not comment on
his own connection with the Ogden case.
His success in getting his bill through Congress depended on
complicated logrolling with other legislation, so that the statute
did not survive a devastating warfare between Clay's Whigs and
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President John Tyler's states' rights followers. It was repealed in
1842. This was another proof that the nation was not ready to
establish a national system.46 In the short time the law lasted, a
large number of bankruptcy proceedings were initiated and their
disposition remained the basis of much litigation for a long while.
Clay was counsel in some of these lingering cases. One was Hous-
ton v Bank of New Orleans (1848), in which the Supreme Court
upheld a broad coverage of the law for his client.47
In considering the long-range importance of Ogden, one can
see that a basic concept of Marshall's minority opinion in rela-
tion to the contract clause survived. In the late nineteenth cen-
tury stockholders sued their corporations to get judicial rulings
against rate structures imposed by state regulations. They con-
tended that the lowered rates were depriving them of their finan-
cial interest, property in dividends, without due process of law,
prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
Their legal actions also rested on their contractual relations to
corporations as stockholders. They could and often did succeed
in court by getting decrees when the laws were either prospective
or retrospective. The impact was the same whether by substan-
tive due process of law or by a remodeled contract clause. Both
were invoked to resist state regulation of corporations. Prospec-
tive legislation affecting business could be weakened not only by
reference to state charters but also to the contract clause, shield-
ing stockholders as well as company officers, who sometimes
generated what amounted to collusive suits.48 Marshall would
have approved the effects, if not this strategy. It amounted to a
prospective application of the contract clause, supposedly for-
bidden by Ogden.
During the 1820s, Clay had been involved in two significant cases,
Green and Ogden, concerning interpretation of the contract
clause. He made an extraordinary effort to protect a land policy
of Kentucky in Green when he sought a rejection of the first
opinion by Story against his state's occupant-claimant law. Vir-
ginia had opposed Kentucky's measure and relied upon the com-
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pact protecting land titles it had issued when detaching the new
western state. Clay represented the interest of occupants who
had shaky titles or none at all and were threatened by Virginia
claimants. In addition to his losing argument in court for a cor-
rection of the adverse pending decision of 1821, he worked hard
to get an agreement by Virginia to submit the dispute to a bilat-
eral commission. Despite his persuasive advocacy of that ap-
proach, he failed to get Virginia's consent to these proposals. And
he failed also in his reargument to change Story's pending opin-
ion. Furthermore, he was irritated by the surprising novelty of
considering the constitutional contract clause as a restraint upon
states as parties to a contract. To his credit, he urged Kentucky
politicians to control, though not abandon, their fiery objections
to the outcome of this case. And today his formula of a calm
legal solution, relying on the constitutional provision for peace-
ful and negotiated interstate compacts, seems correct.
In Ogden he was not completely successful in upholding the
validity of state bankruptcy laws. He managed to get only a par-
tial decision saving their prospective if not retrospective effects.
Through the nineteenth century attempts in Congress to estab-
lish a uniform and comprehensive national policy failed except
for occasional and brief periods. This left the matter to whatever
states could or would do. And that was even less after adoption
of the due process clause after the Civil War, which was also a
formidable barrier to state power. These problems indicated the
desirability of obtaining a national bankruptcy system. The case
showed the importance of an often underemphasized second part
of Ogden, prohibiting state bankruptcy legislation from applica-
tion to interstate situations. Clay's tireless effort in behalf of his
American System promoting the country's economic development
seemed all the more justified.
BANKING
hile much involved in the contract-clause cases of Green
and Ogden during the early 1820s, Clay gave more attention to
legal business for the Bank of the United States (BUS). His mo-
tive was still to recover from his worrisome financial situation,
including a large indebtedness to that institution. He had mort-
gaged his residence and land at Ashland for $40,000, as well as
the Kentucky Hotel in Lexington for $22,000—obligations not
wholly retired until 1830.1
In June 1820 he put an announcement in the Kentucky Re-
porter: "I intend to recommence the practice of the Law, and for
this purpose I shall attend the Court of Appeals, the Circuit Court
of the United States at Frankfort, the Circuit Court of the U.
States at Columbus in Ohio, and the Fayette Circuit Court."2
That winter he gave up his post as speaker of the House and
refused reelection as a member, effective in March 1821. Already
he had assumed the position of superintendent of the bank's le-
gal affairs in Kentucky and Ohio.3
He had also settled the question of his fees in an exchange
with the BUS president, Langdon Cheves. Pointing out the heavy
load of litigation, about four hundred cases in the two states and
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debts of $2,000,000, he suggested an annual fee of $5,000. Cheves
consulted the board of directors and offered $3,000, with addi-
tional compensation when he appeared in court as the solicitor
for cases that arose in Kentucky. Surprisingly, Clay replied he
was quite satisfied.4
An early, protracted problem involved a large debt to the
bank by Senator Richard Johnson and his brother James. Alto-
gether, the notes amounted to $130,000, secured by lands and
town tracts in Kentucky and Ohio. Clay was reluctant to accept
Johnson's offer to turn over the property, for he was then advis-
ing the bank to avoid acquiring real estate. Besides, he was un-
easy to move against a friend and such a prominent figure.
Consider Johnson's public services and "the esteem in which he
is everywhere held," the lawyer advised. Eventually, he conceded
the need to settle the debts by a complete transfer of the broth-
ers' holdings.5
As he began work in collecting debts to the bank, Clay in-
clined toward a lenient strategy. Recognizing the dreadful im-
pact of hard times across the country, the desperate condition of
those unable to meet their obligations, he advised the board back
in Philadelphia to take a deliberate approach. It might require as
much as five years to eliminate the enormous debts now in de-
fault. Meanwhile, he warned, do not gain the reputation of a
heartless money changer, oppressing farmers and merchants of
the West.6
Nevertheless, with the bank's approval, he set about forming
a system that became increasingly efficient and strict. As legal
superintendent for Kentucky and Ohio, he monitored the cash-
iers at BUS branches in Lexington, Louisville, and Chillicothe, as
well as the agency in the Cincinnati office, which for the time
being had lost its status as a branch equal to the others. At loca-
tions in Ohio, lawyers, called solicitors, handled cases in court
while Clay himself acted as solicitor in Kentucky. In addition,
there were clerks who kept records on proceedings in litigation
and their financial aspects.
As months passed, he developed close oversight of personnel
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and procedures by frequent correspondence from Lexington or
by travel to the Ohio offices. He insisted upon prompt, effective
work in the courts to get judicial executions on debts. And he
improved methods of record keeping on the subsequent status of
compliance.7 He tightened enforcement by placing notice in the
newspapers to debtors, though he was not required to do so. He
rationalized that it was "further evidence of that spirit of for-
bearance and moderation, which has constantly characterized
[the bank's] conduct." If debtors did not respond satisfactorily,
he ordered his officers to "put them into the hands of the Marshall
accordingly."8
Perhaps his most severe reaction to an elusive debtor was
aimed at Hugh Glenn, who owed the bank more than $117,000.
Clay directed George Jones at the Cincinnati agency to get a writ
from the court for arrest and imprisonment of Glenn. In fact, he
wondered, how had Glenn already got a release from jail? Later,
he heard that Glenn might come down the river in his boat. If he
did, he instructed Jones to get a levy confiscating it.9 That kind
of remedy seemed to him justifiable, for he had been urging the
legislature to authorize seizure of delinquent debtors' property.
A protracted, interesting case that Clay did not argue but
closely monitored was Piatt v Vattier. It involved very valuable
land and a hotel located in the center of Cincinnati. Sources indi-
cate his continuing advice on how to handle the suit, which
dragged on until a decision of the Supreme Court in favor of the
BUS. The decision applied the statute of limitations to a fraudu-
lent certificate of ownership that Robert Piatt had presented to
the bank.10
The lawyer developed other strategies in collecting debts. One
settlement was to receive a transfer of a company's assets in the
form of debts owed to that company.11 And he now considered
even taking personal property to carry out judgments against
debtors.12
Despite Clay's early reluctance for the bank to acquire real
estate, he found it increasingly necessary, as large numbers of the
bank's debtors had only that kind of collateral to comply with
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court executions. Too often, they were also delinquent in their
tax payments and were forced to put their land up for sale. In
some instances he instructed his agents to attend these tax auc-
tions and to bid for the property. The situation bothered him as
well as the owners. Besides the economic undesirability of the
corporation's taking this course, it would generate even more
hard feelings by the public. Nevertheless, his correspondence with
the bank's agents, such as George Jones in Cincinnati, frequently
gave them detailed instructions in handling land cases in court
and in following up with more detailed directions on getting com-
pliance. A flurry of letters to Jones concerned intricate litigation
about certain land in Ohio, originally granted to John Cleves
Symmes and now held by a relative. The attorney representing
her, as well as Robert Piatt, was Nicholas Longworth. The bank
tangled with Longworth, apparently not a very principled char-
acter, but Clay did prevail in this suit.13
He returned to Congress in December 1823, which reduced,
though did not end, his professional work for the bank. He con-
tinued to advise Nicholas Biddle, now the corporation's presi-
dent, about pending cases with which he was familiar. Indeed, he
maintained the connection while he was a candidate during the
complicated presidential election of 1824 and until he became
secretary of state the following March.
In looking back upon the preceding four years, he felt proud
of his record of success. In all but a very few of the hundreds of
cases with which he had something to do, there was only a hand-
ful in which he or his associates failed to get a favorable court
order, affirming the bank's legal right to collect. That is not to
say that the eventual outcome of the cases was always complete
compliance with the judgments, for there had to be compromises
with distressed debtors; and there were, of course, innumerable
evasions of payment.14 Cheves, Biddle, and other bank execu-
tives generously praised his contributions and would often rely
upon him in the future. He was also rewarded adequately in a
monetary sense, at least to help him recoup his personal finances,
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though compared with the incomes of other prominent lawyers,
his remuneration was modest.15
Still, did his role as a determined prosecutor of hapless debt-
ors hurt him politically? Opinion in both Kentucky and Ohio
was aroused against the bank, but not against Clay personally.
One of his closest friends in Ohio was Charles Hammond, a
prominent editor and legislator, who had strongly supported
Clay's national policies and presidential hopes. However, he wrote
a letter scolding the Kentuckian for using harsh tactics against
debtors and for trampling the state's rights in the current Osborn
case on taxing the bank. Clay must check these grievances, he
warned. In referring to the coming election, he declared, "There
are, I am persuaded, many who will feel it their duty to make
opinions upon this subject something like a sine qua non."16
It is doubtful that there was much damage done to Clay the
politician in 1824. In Kentucky he lost some votes for the presi-
dency to Jackson, which probably reflected dissatisfaction with
his disapproval of that state's relief laws but apparently not with
his activity as lawyer in debt collection. Old Hickory's personal
popularity must have been a more important factor. In Ohio a
modern researcher studied original sources of information on
Clay's bank cases and on voting in some counties, which did not
indicate a significant correlation of law and politics unfavorable
to him. In fact, he carried the state.17
During this period of his professional connection with the
national bank, a fundamental question was the very existence of
its offices throughout the country. A well-known instance of this
issue was the case of Osborn v Bank of the United States (1824),
coming up to the Supreme Court from Ohio; but the question
had also arisen in several other states, especially in Maryland. As
legal superintendent for the BUS in two states, Clay played an
active role in handling the problem in Kentucky as well as Ohio.
A downturn of the economy there tightened credit, created a
banking crisis, depressed the condition of debtors, and induced
angry attacks upon the two BUS branches at Lexington and Lou-
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isville as being largely responsible for hard times. Like other states,
Kentucky laid a heavy annual tax, here of $60,000, on each branch
with the obvious purpose of driving out the institution. Just as
happened at the office in Maryland, the bank's reaction was re-
fusal to pay this levy because of its unconstitutionality. When the
McCulloch decision (1819) invalidated Maryland's taxation of
the bank, the Kentucky courts retreated, and the trend of the
controversy shifted against the institution's opponents.18 While
strongly disapproving his state's effort to tax the bank, Clay had
believed time was on the side of the BUS and had predicted it
would receive judicial support.19
His predictions were justified. One indication was a case he
won in the Kentucky Court of Appeals, upholding the bank's
authority to purchase and otherwise acquire promissory notes in
the course of business with borrowers. This victory greatly
strengthened its operation.20
Later in Roberts v BUS (1822) Clay had the opportunity to
argue in the federal circuit court for the important right of the
corporation's access as a party in suits before national tribunals.
Winning here might be a large stride toward success in the simi-
lar jurisdictional case of Osborn, developing in Ohio and paving
the way to the Supreme Court. The question in Roberts centered
on a congressional law of 1816, chartering the national bank
and conferring its standing in United States courts. Was this stat-
ute constitutional? Representing the BUS, Clay relied upon ar-
ticle 3, section 1, of the Constitution, extending the federal judicial
power "to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Con-
stitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties." Since the
bank's charter was a law of the United States, Clay could con-
vincingly contend it was decisive for his client. The judges agreed.
They conceded there were hardly any precedents for their deci-
sion, but they remarked that they received "great assistance from
arguments we have heard from the bar."21
Though generally this was a time when the numbers of de-
faulting debtors escalated, Clay cautiously avoided entanglement
in Kentucky's highly explosive policy of relief for them. He clearly
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disapproved this legislation, postponing or otherwise moderat-
ing debtors' payments; but it was risky politically to counter the
high tide of relief sentiment. He seldom took cases involving the
measures. Not until the midtwenties did the anti-relief legislators
and judges gain an upper hand. Meanwhile, he advised Biddle it
was not in the bank's interest to challenge the constitutionality
of these statutes. It would be better, he wrote, to give debtors
more time and therefore stand a better chance of collection. He
assured the BUS president he would supply information and sug-
gestions to other counsel on handling such questions.22 In the hun-
dreds of cases for straight judicial execution of debtor liability which
he did present, he proudly reported almost complete success in
obtaining court orders.23 Nevertheless, favorable rulings here, as
in Ohio, did not always cause full or quick compliance.
By 1824 his activity as lawyer had centered on a crucial ap-
peal to the Supreme Court involving Ohio's crippling taxation of
BUS branches there. Over several years this intense constitutional
dispute had developed out of economic conditions similar to those
in Kentucky and several other states. Following the peace treaty
of 1815, the state had experienced a boom. A surge of migration
from South and East, mounting land-office sales, and ambitious
projects of internal improvements led to a condition of financial
overexpansion. The Ohio legislature had chartered many banks,
twenty-three by 1818, generating a great flurry of loans while
failing to require specie payment of their notes. Then two branch
offices of the national bank set up business at Cincinnati and
Chillicothe, trying to stabilize conditions but soon having to con-
tract credit severely. The result was deep trouble for debtors whose
mortgages were foreclosed. It was a particularly serious situa-
tion in the Cincinnati area where the BUS took over a very large
amount of real estate. So one consequence of all this was attach-
ment of blame for the crisis to that institution. It did not help to
tell those who suffered that a panic and depression afflicted the
country as a whole.24
The legislature responded to rising complaint in February
1819 with a statute laying a heavy annual tax of $50,000 on
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each of the two bank branches. If the bank refused to pay this
tax, the law directed the state auditor to levy its funds and goods.
It would probably leave Ohio, the sponsors of the legislation
believed, rather than assume such a burden; and that would be a
desirable outcome of the policy, since the exploitative corpora-
tion did not have the right to operate in their jurisdiction with-
out permission. No matter what the national government did, this
sovereign state had constitutional power to define its own author-
ity on such questions, politicians insisted. But a few weeks later,
the Supreme Court invalidated a similar tax in McCulloch v Mary-
land (1819), a heavy blow to other states resisting the BUS.25
Responsibility to collect the Ohio tax lay with the state audi-
tor, Ralph Osborn, whose name would be permanently associ-
ated with this unusual legal episode. He confronted two contrary
options. One was the bank's request for an injunction by the
federal circuit court against collecting the tax. The other was a
warrant by the state to collect the tax. He decided to ignore the
possible injunction on the ground that the request for it was an
incomplete petition, only to be served with a subpoena ordering
his appearance in court. He would proceed to collect the tax.26
The auditor therefore directed Sheriff John Harper and an as-
sistant to go at once to Chillicothe and seize $100,000 from the
BUS branch. At this point in the weird story, as soon as the two
men arrived, they jumped over the bank's counter, opened the
vault, commandeered the money, loaded it in a wagon, and hur-
ried back to Columbus, the capital. Here they turned their re-
ceipts over to the state treasurer, Samuel Sullivan. Again there
was a hearing at the federal court on complaints of contempt and
trespass, ending in jail time for both Harper and Sullivan. The
bank also charged Osborn himself with contempt and trespass too.27
In strange proceedings John Wright, the United States dis-
trict attorney, appeared not only as prosecutor for the federal
government in this criminal case but also as one of the state de-
fendants in it. Acting as the bank's attorney, Clay protested that
the dual status was an obvious conflict of interest. He persuaded
the court to name himself a prosecuting "solicitor" to assist
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Wright, which gave him also dual status. Altogether, the situa-
tion was quite confusing. At any rate, the charge of contempt
was dropped, leaving only trespass. By agreement of counsel, the
money was turned over to commissioners, pending a decision by
the Supreme Court's review of this dispute in Washington.28
At an earlier hearing, the circuit court had signaled what the
outcome of that review might be. It rejected the state's argument
that this was not merely a suit against Osborn as an individual
but in effect against Ohio itself, which would be contrary to the
Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution. Instead, the court ad-
hered to the recent decision of the highest tribunal in McCulloch,
invalidating Maryland's taxation of the national bank as a deci-
sive precedent in the present case and disarming the resistant
Osborn.29
Meanwhile, the legislature strengthened its attack. Charles
Hammond's committee there issued a hard-line report, justifying
the tax, however burdensome it may have been. Indeed, it was
admittedly a penalty this private and unwelcome corporation must
bear or preferably leave the state. To expedite the bank's depar-
ture, the committee recommended denying state protection of
the bank's operations by refusing to record its property transac-
tions officially and depriving it of remedies in Ohio courts. The
panel would also withdraw the federal court's use of the state's
jails. These penalties would amount to outlawry of the BUS.
Hammond then advanced a bold criticism of the Supreme
Court's affirmation of the bank's constitutionality in the
McCulloch case, when it invalidated state taxation. And he con-
demned the recent action of the federal circuit court in favor of
the bank against Osborn and others. Ohio, he said, had greater
power than these judges in interpreting the Constitution. His
authority was the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions of 1798,
the favorite scripture of states' rights Jeffersonians. The legisla-
ture voted overwhelming approval of the committee's recommen-
dations, including one to circulate them among all the states as
well as national officials and congressmen at Washington.30
This manifesto did not recruit much help across the country.
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Even states that had been or would be advocates of a union based
upon a loose compact of sovereign members did not come for-
ward with concurrences. One of the few exceptions was Geor-
gia, presently combatting the BUS branch in a controversy with
its state bank in a federal circuit court. That tribunal's judges
divided in opinion so that the case was certified to the Supreme
Court and would be decided with Osborn.31
At least one state, Massachusetts, expressed strong disap-
proval of Hammond's states' rights exegesis. Apparently shaped
by Daniel Webster, adopted by his legislature, and noticed na-
tionally, the rebuttal criticized Ohio for deviation from correct
constitutional theory. The congressional charter of the national
bank, a United States statute, was the supreme law of the land,
state policy to the contrary notwithstanding. And Ohio's reli-
ance upon the Eleventh Amendment as immunity from the
corporation's suit did not protect its officials who employed an
unconstitutional measure. More would be heard from Webster
when he became one of the bank's attorneys in the appeal of
Osborn to the Supreme Court.32
An interesting reaction to these events came from Hezekiah
Niles's Weekly Register, which was publishing a great deal of
information about them for its many readers at the time and for
later historians. A longstanding critic of the national bank, Niles
agreed with much of Ohio's complaints against a heartless BUS
treatment of state banks and of debtors. He believed Congress
should authorize state taxation in order to clarify the boundaries
of power. Nevertheless, the editor decidedly disapproved rash
state action because the situation was one of legal controversy
and not of forcible remedy. As a serious question of constitu-
tional law, he said, the dispute demanded peaceful and construc-
tive consideration. It was good advice, but it did not pacify many
Ohioans.33
The detention of state officers who had seized the bank's funds
raised questions for Clay. Harper and others had been held in a
local jail for some months and later filed a bill in a state court for
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false imprisonment. Clay knew that this would be a friendly fo-
rum for these officers and therefore considered how to transfer
their case to a federal tribunal, preferably the Supreme Court.
This could be done by the process of removal to it at the outset
or by an appeal there after a state decision. As it happened, nei-
ther effort was necessary as the issue became moot.34 He would
not have had to worry about the state system of justice if there
had been a federal prison in Ohio to which the federal circuit
court could have assigned violators of its rulings. This difficulty
had increased as a result of legislative outlawry of the bank, de-
nying the use of state jails for prisoners committed under United
States authority. But his concerns lessened when he got a mea-
sure through Congress that provided funds for hiring "a conve-
nient place to serve as a temporary jail."35
Another bothersome effect of outlawry would stop official
recording and validating the bank's operations. Clay instructed
BUS solicitors how to respond to this obstruction. If they sub-
mitted documents to be recorded by state officers or judges who
refused, he said, the attorneys should obtain a written statement
from them. The refusal itself could be used then or later with
federal help for proof of authenticity. He did believe that judicial
relief from this vexation was near.36
There were also signs of some kind of settlement of the con-
troversy by the two sides. In negotiations with Clay during Janu-
ary 1821, Hammond reported action by the legislature and
proposals for a compromise. The state would reduce the com-
bined annual tax on the two branches from $100,000, which
had been seized, to $5,000 and would return the difference to
the bank. But Clay understood that the principle of a tax would
remain and that the only way to avoid it would be to leave Ohio.
So he rejected this sort of offer.37 A month later, the lower house
of the legislature did pass a bill to restore the BUS funds without
conditions, but the upper chamber amended it to require with-
drawal of the branch offices. "As we have exhausted the cup of
conciliation," Clay declared, "nothing remains to us but to pro-
66 Henry Clay the Lawyer
ceed firmly 6c temperately in our purpose. That shall be done,
and in September next, if I live, we will have a Judgment or de-
cree, or both for the money." 38
Cheves and his successor as bank president, Nicholas Biddle,
praised Clay's management of the case, assured him the board of
directors was entirely satisfied, provided him with a liberal com-
pensation for his representation in the Ohio courts, and prom-
ised more for the pending appeal to the Supreme Court.
Despite delay through 1823, he was pleased with the shape
of questions the high court would decide, particularly that of
state taxation of the branches, contrary to the McCulloch rule.
Of course, the more difficult issue, he thought, was whether the
federal circuit court had correctly assumed jurisdiction over an
injunction to Osborn, a state official, perhaps amounting to an
unconstitutional suit against the state itself.39
At last, in February 1824, he argued the case for the bank in
the Supreme Court. Charles Hammond and John Wright, the
prominent Ohioans involved in this controversy from the begin-
ning, were formidable opponents and made a powerful plea for
the state's policy. Clay alone appeared for the bank, but a few
days later, Chief Justice Marshall requested further argument on
the issue of the circuit court's jurisdiction. He also ordered that
the similar case from Georgia be considered along with Osborn.
Then other lawyers joined Wright on the appeal, while Daniel
Webster and John Sergeant, both stalwart BUS attorneys, appeared
with Clay in the second hearing.
Counsel for Osborn emphasized the Eleventh Amendment's
prohibition of federal suits commenced against a state (Ohio) by
citizens of another state (the bank corporation). They connected
this provision to the ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity of a
government from litigation without its consent. Though an in-
junction had been only nominally issued against Osborn and other
individuals, they contended it was, in effect, an unconstitutional
suit against the state. They also cited precedents consistently de-
nying corporations, such as the bank, the standing of citizenship
as parties in federal courts.
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Clay's opponents added a rather hopeless call for reversal of
Marshall's holding in McCulloch, depriving states of the power
to tax the institution.40 Clay felt quite comfortable about the
durability of that ruling, as well he might in John Marshall's court.
This was true of his argument at the first hearing when he ap-
peared alone for the bank and more so in the combined argu-
ment with Webster and Sergeant at the second hearing. On both
occasions, he focused on the question of whether the federal cir-
cuit court had jurisdiction. Its injunction was properly directed
to Osborn individually, not to the state of Ohio, he insisted. Even
though the state was affected by the order to return the seized
funds to the bank, Ohio was not formally a party of record in the
case. Osborn himself had been therefore identified correctly as
the defendant. The chief justice must have been listening care-
fully when Clay advanced this point.41
The lawyer also emphasized the precedent of U.S. v Peters
(1809), a Supreme Court decision. In an old controversy over
possession of proceeds from a prize ship, the federal circuit judge
in Pennsylvania, Richard Peters, had met resistance by aroused
officials who opposed his ordering a return of the assets to cer-
tain claimants rather than to the state. The cautious Peters re-
frained from finally executing his decision for these claimants,
and an appeal to get him to do it went to the Supreme Court. It
became clear that the state was the key element in the dispute
and might invoke the Eleventh Amendment to prevent commence-
ment of a suit in federal court against it by out-of-state claim-
ants. To sidestep the amendment's barrier, Marshall's opinion
made Judge Peters instead of the state the defendant and ordered
him to make the award to the claimants. So Peters was the for-
mal party of record but not the real target. The outcome was to
bypass Pennsylvania, unlikely to acquiesce in an adverse award.
Here was a possible parallel with Osborn, which could restrict
Ohio, even though Ralph Osborn individually was the party of
record. It was a useful strategy to shape the record of a case
according to circumstances.42
Clay brought in Cohens v Virginia (1821) as another prece-
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dent to define the Eleventh Amendment. But he made little
progress with it since it was not an original suit "commenced"
against a state, as the language of the amendment specified. In-
stead, it was an appeal to the high court after prosecution of
persons by a state, which had commenced a controversy. Still,
Cohens did lay out the broad dimensions of a law of the United
States superior to a law of a state in Marshall's best version of
constitutional nationalism. Clay saw this much in Cohens appli-
cable to Osborn. He directed attention to the congressional char-
ter of the bank in 1816, a law of the United States. It granted the
corporation the valuable right to sue or defend cases in the fed-
eral circuit courts. This provision, he said, was a valid derivative
from the Constitution, article 3, section 2, extending the national
judicial power to "all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
the Constitution, and the Laws of the United States." And article
6 made national statutes "the supreme Law of the Land . . . any-
thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding." As in Cohens, the Supreme Court's jurisdic-
tion in Osborn must prevail over that of a state.43
It was odd that Clay did not specifically urge the court to fol-
low the precedent of the Roberts case, which he had won for the
bank in the federal circuit court in Kentucky. He was, of course,
very much aware of its relevance in assuring the bank access to
national courts, and it is probable the chief justice was too.44
Now Marshall delivered a long opinion soon after argument
had ended. It was a typically bold exposition of the Constitution
but included some dubious comments on how the court should
handle suits attacking state laws. Nevertheless, his disposition of
the case pleased Clay entirely.
On the question of jurisdiction of federal courts in suits against
a state by a party from another state, he reduced the potential
coverage accorded it by the Eleventh Amendment. Though con-
ceding protection for the state if directly named as a party in the
action's title, the chief justice did not offer much if the suit were
brought against a state official, such as Osborn. The state would
have to be the party of record in the case, technically appearing
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as defendant, not merely having an important interest in the out-
come. But Osborn, not Ohio, had been identified as the defen-
dant on the record, and therefore he could not claim immunity.
Exactly what Clay and his colleagues had contended. That for-
mula was too mechanical and probably unfair, squeezing the of-
ficial between duty to the state and compulsion by federal judges.
Marshall had surer footing when he drew upon the bank's
charter, a law of the United States, which conferred to it the privi-
lege of suit and defense in the nation's circuit courts. He gave the
charter the broadest interpretation, indeed for all operations as a
financial corporation. His authority was article 3 of the Consti-
tution, establishing the national judicial power over all questions
arising under that document and the laws of the United States.
The most significant but least surprising holding in Marshall's
opinion adhered to the McCulloch precedent. Like Maryland,
Ohio could not tax the national bank because it was the fiscal
agent of the federal government, he declared again. It held de-
posits and made disbursements of the Treasury, assisted in issu-
ance and retirement of bonds, circulated its notes serving as the
country's prevalent currency, and coordinated operations of state
banks, "all necessary and proper" constitutional functions, re-
lated to delegated congressional powers, not to be hindered by
taxation.45
Justice William Johnson dissented, as he occasionally did.
Though expressing approval of the bank and disapproval of state
interference, he worried about potential limits on jurisdiction of
state courts. He wondered why such cases as Osborn should not
first go to those tribunals, always later subject to review by the
Supreme Court. Though complicating the judicial process, that
alternative might have yielded some useful insights into local cir-
cumstances.46
The effects of the Osborn decision were mixed. Marshall's
rigid emphasis upon the formal party of record did not always
have clear-cut applications. Shortly afterward he disposed of an-
other case rather differently. In this suit against a state governor,
who was the party of record, he rejected jurisdiction because the
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action was really aimed at the state, not that official personally—
seemingly a reversal of direction.47 And through the years, the
Court found exceptions to a simple formula of sovereign immu-
nity based on the Eleventh Amendment. It might find the party
of record a nominal instead of the actual target and was willing
to look into factual considerations.48 In an era of extensive state
economic regulation, it invoked the expanding contract and due
process clauses of the Constitution to restrict enforcement of leg-
islation despite the Eleventh Amendment. And it held repeatedly
that a state could not claim sovereign immunity if relying upon
an unconstitutional law. The court later responded to questions
in some ways that Marshall the conservative judge and Clay the
conservative lawyer could have found productive.49
Besides the Bank of the United States, Clay had a long rela-
tionship with state banks in Kentucky, beginning soon after his
arrival in the West. As stockholder, board member, and lawyer,
he prominently served and influenced several of these institu-
tions. In the twenties and thirties he was especially involved in
the operations of the Bank of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
A highlight was his representation as its counsel in the well-known
case of Briscoe v Bank of Kentucky (1837).
To understand his connection with this decision, one must
look back to 1820 when he attended a meeting of that bank's
directors. He successfully presented a resolution to obtain re-
newal of the institution's state charter, but his other resolutions,
calling for more conservative policies on reserves, note issues,
and loans, all to protect the public against suspension of specie
payment, failed adoption.50 Trouble lay ahead as a depression
intensified, putting the bank in an increasingly weak position.
With little capital it issued ever more paper with dwindling re-
serves to redeem it.
This situation and Clay's feelings were well illustrated by his
own financial difficulty, partly due to his acquisition of large
amounts of Bank of Kentucky notes in the early twenties. Failing
to get these notes redeemed in specie, he agreed to accept from
the bank the personal notes it had received from debtors. But he
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could not get these notes redeemed either.51 He then tried to ex-
change the bank paper at the Lexington branch of the BUS, but
Biddle informed him the board of directors at Philadelphia re-
jected his request.52 He later expressed his dissatisfaction in plain
language: "Our paper bank in Kentucky has so far disappointed
the hopes of the public that everybody is tired of it and desirous
to get back, as soon as we can, to a specie circulation."53 Clay
surely remembered the bank's sorry record for a long while, es-
pecially in 1837 when, as its counsel in the Supreme Court, he
argued Briscoe v Bank of Kentucky.
The case arose from this very practice of circulating irredeem-
able bank notes. It involved a loan made by the bank in these
notes and later nonpayment by the debtor, John Briscoe, who
challenged their validity. His counsel contended they were mere
paper, amounting to bills of credit, supported only by the state's
credit and good faith. He reasoned that the bank was the crea-
ture and agent of the state. Its corporate charter authorized the
state to select its officers, subscribe all its stock, and generally
control its operations. So the state's resort to this kind of notes
was unconstitutional, because it was prohibited from issuing bills
of credit by a clause in article 1, section 10.54
In preparing argument for the bank in Briscoe, Clay had to
devise a way to counter a recent decision of the Marshall court in
Craig v Missouri (1830), holding that loan certificates issued by
that state were bills of credit and therefore constitutionally pro-
hibited. Intended as a medium of payment for taxes and debts to
the state and for salaries to state employees but not for legal
tender in all circumstances, some certificates had nevertheless
found their way into general circulation. In a characteristically
nationalist, conservative opinion, the chief justice had ruled the
Missouri certificates to be bills of credit. He had reviewed finan-
cial history as far back as the era of the Revolution to demon-
strate troublesome effects of such policies. The value of that kind
of medium had constantly fluctuated, he declared, and had caused
immense losses, ruinous speculations, and destruction of "all
confidence between man and man."
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In the minority of the four-to-three decision, William Johnson
had thought the certificates were not a circulating medium; fur-
thermore, he had found no precise meaning of the term "bills of
credit." Smith Thompson had also dissented with a worrisome
reference to bank notes in all the states as a large component of
the currency of the country. Would the court also declare them
invalid? McLean, dissenting too, had wondered about that pos-
sibility. Nevertheless, while hearing cases in the federal circuit
court of Kentucky, he had not caused the bank any trouble about
its notes.55
For the Briscoe hearing, Clay could count on an encouraging
realignment of the court. Though one of the dissenters in Craig,
Johnson, was no longer on the bench, the other two, Thompson
and McLean, were. Marshall had died and was replaced as chief
justice by the arch Jacksonian states' righter Roger Taney. And
two more Democratic appointees, Philip Barbour and James
Wayne, made up a majority of at least five justices among the
seven who would sit in the forthcoming case in 1837 and might
bypass Craig. What a peculiar situation for the staunch national-
ist Clay to advance state power over banks and attract such as-
sistance from members of the political party with which he had
long done battle about banking! Would Story, learned veteran
from the Marshall court, be the only dissenter since the tables
were turned?
Other help for Clay to win the bank's cause had been the
outcome of a hearing on it before the high tribunal in 1834, three
years earlier. The proceedings were merely mentioned in the court
report but predictive of a new direction. Only five of the seven
members sat, and the vote of three to two against the Bank of
Kentucky was one vote short of the required majority of the full
court of seven. After this fortunate escape by Clay's side, the case
was carried over to the term of 1837 for the more friendly Taney
court to decide.56
For appellant Briscoe, Joseph White and Samuel Southard
urged the court to apply Craig as precedent. Like Missouri's loan
office, they contended, the bank as Kentucky's agent was circu-
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lating unconstitutional bills of credit as legal tender. Southard, a
close political friend of Clay, knew the vulnerable spots in his
record. During hard times the Kentuckian had opposed the state's
ill-advised chartering of numerous wildcat banks, such as the so-
called forty thieves. And he had strongly criticized loose prac-
tices of the Bank of Kentucky in floating irredeemable paper and
lacking sufficient reserves, said Southard. It was all a part of the
relief program he had opposed in those days. But now he was an
advocate for the same financial institution.57
In his argument Clay emphasized a separation of the bank
from the state. It was a corporation issuing its own notes, not
those of the state, he said, so that the constitutional prohibition
of state bills of credit would be inapplicable. The Kentucky
institution's paper resembled that of all state-created banks in
the country. If the court took the opposite view, Clay predicted,
the notes of these banks would be endangered, a frightening pos-
sibility because of the widespread use of this medium in the
economy. Still, his questionable depiction of the Kentucky
corporation's functions as independent of its creator was crucial
to his case.58 Yet he seemed to reach rather far by referring to an
earlier decision in which the Supreme Court did find a close rela-
tionship of the two but refrained from ruling against it.59 He fin-
ished with a call for judicial restraint: "Keep to the plain meaning
of the terms of the constitution, and do not seek, by construc-
tion, to include in its prohibitions, such paper as that which is
brought into question in this case, and all will be safe."60
Justice McLean delivered the court's opinion. One of the dis-
senters in Craig, he now spoke for a decided majority. His views
were well settled, no doubt all the more because he had attended
the federal circuit court in Kentucky where this subject had been
prominent. He did concede there was an intimate connection of
bank and state, beyond what Clay had allowed. The corporation's
charter, he said, allowed the state to select bank officers, to hold
all its stock, and to issue notes, which were declared by law to be
acceptable in various kinds of payments. Nevertheless, he ruled
they were not bills of credit and offered a rather weak explana-
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tion that the notes were merely necessary measures for economic
relief. They were not intended to supply legal tender, he added
inconsistently. Like Clay, McLean seemed to be quite worried
about a decision against Kentucky's notes spreading to bank notes
in other states.61
Story, the only dissenter, displayed his well-known ability in
an animated opinion. He remarked that Marshall had twice heard
argument on the present question and in both instances had a
majority with him, once when invalidating state notes in Craig
and later in the first Briscoe hearing though lacking a quorum on
the bench. Regretting that the chief justice could not now speak
for himself, Story felt obliged to "vindicate his memory." Specifi-
cally, he disagreed with Clay's contention that the bank and the
state were distinctly separate, so that the corporation's notes were
not state bills of credit. Instead, Story declared, the state had its
agent, the bank, issue them, and they circulated as money. Look
at the initial pleas in the case, he urged, and you will find the
bank admitted it had issued bills of credit and promised to pay
them in behalf of the state. In general, Story declared he would
not uphold a practice to do something indirectly by assigning a
false name to it when it was a direct circumvention of constitu-
tional law.62
In winning this case, Clay had indeed resorted to some weak
logic. His contention that the Commonwealth Bank of Kentucky
was a corporation separate from the state was inaccurate. The
bank was far from independent of the state. Just the opposite.
Notes were nominally issued by the corporation, but Story was
correct in complaining that the effect was to issue state bills of
credit. And the state could do so because it owned all the bank's
stock, chose its officers, and controlled its operations.63 The ma-
jority decision extended into the 1830s an accommodation the
state had provided to its hard pressed bank during the twenties.
But as Clay and others said during the court's hearing of Briscoe,
the bank had now recovered and was redeeming its notes on a
sound basis. An important long-range effect of the decision was
to reduce the likelihood that state-bank paper would be invali-
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dated as an established medium of exchange in the country's
economy. Judges and lawyers emphasized this point. Yet they
could not know that within weeks, in early 1837, a severe finan-
cial panic would afflict the land and introduce a long-range de-
pression. State bank notes lost quality whatever the court had
said. And three decades later, they would be driven from circula-
tion altogether by national policy.64
In assessing two of Clay's constitutional cases in the Supreme
Court, Osborn and Briscoe, in behalf of national and state banks,
one sees a lawyer well-informed about financial and legal sub-
jects, reflecting his own involvement in their political dimensions.
His perspective was that of a conservative who valued economic
growth, understandable in light of his personal experience in
Kentucky from an early date and of his long activity in the na-
tional arena where issues had constitutional importance.
During the 1820s Clay had been quite busy as counsel for
the BUS in charge of collecting debts in western states. During an
economic recession there was much to do to handle resulting
legal and political problems. This at a time on the national scene
when the Jacksonian attack upon the institution as a monster
would soon prevail on the question of renewing its charter. Clay
led the bank's weakening defense in Congress on that issue.
His early approach to collecting debts to the bank was rather
lenient, no doubt influenced by general economic conditions. It
was not only a realistic response to them but also an effort to
check long-range hostility of the public. In Kentucky particu-
larly, he faced the anti-bank discontent that had led to the con-
troversial policy of debtor relief. Though disliking those measures,
he was circumspect in advancing his negative opinion.
His strategy gradually tightened. He developed a system in-
volving action in the courts, both state and federal. He kept in
close touch with the bank's agents at the branches in Ohio. By
his instructions, they filed suits to foreclose mortgages transfer-
ring assets, much of it land, to the BUS. Judicial orders were
issued against debtors in large numbers, notwithstanding eva-
sions and obstructions. No wonder the corporation had been
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widely labeled the monster. Clay himself carried out this move in
the Kentucky courts while instructing his agents in Ohio. It was
there that popular resistance led into the key case of Osborn.
Now he took over the litigation involving the state's auditor,
who had enforced the law of Ohio for seizure of bank funds
from crippling taxes. Clay's work in the federal circuit court was
well handled. He got an injunction forbidding this taxation and
a ruling for jurisdiction concerning unconstitutional actions of
Osborn personally, not the state. In the long run, that was the
most significant issue, depending on a ground-breaking interpre-
tation of the Eleventh Amendment. Gaining a decision here that
the suit was against an individual not the state itself, prohibited
by that amendment, he moved on to the Supreme Court, a prom-
ising setting for affirming this answer to the question.
Even more promising was the prospect of Chief Justice
Marshall's adhering to his recent conclusion in the McCulloch
case that a state could not tax and therefore destroy the national
bank as an arm of the government. And he did reiterate it. So
Clay's principal concern remained the meaning of the Eleventh
Amendment. Was the present case a prohibited suit against a
state or was it what its title indicated: a suit against Ralph Osborn,
responsible for an unconstitutional act? In insisting that the case
was against Osborn, Clay and his colleagues offered, to some
extent, an artificial, pro forma definition instead of a careful fac-
tual analysis of the real character of the so-called "party of
record." An alternative path Clay could have followed would
have been to rely upon Roberts v BUS (1822), his recent federal
circuit case in Kentucky, recognizing the standing of the national
bank as a party in that tribunal. Roberts upheld the Bank's right
on the basis of its congressional charter, a law of the United States,
carrying with it access to and protection of the national courts.
Article 3 of the Constitution confers jurisdiction in such cases.
That was the core of his argument now. But it is unclear why he
and the chief justice did not cite Roberts because both of them
could recall it well. Perhaps he thought it unnecessary to develop
his present argument.
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Another instance of the close relationship of banking and
constitutional law was Briscoe, an obvious circumvention of the
clause prohibiting state bills of credit. In representing the Bank
of Kentucky, Clay seemed out of character. Unconvincingly he
denied it was a state agency in ownership and operation when it
issued its notes, quite obviously the kind of currency forbidden.
And Clay knew it. This at a time when the Jacksonian political
faith promoted the option of state banks instead of a national
bank, favored by Clay and his party. His opponent during the
hearing, Samuel Southard, who knew him well, exploited his in-
consistencies, but not enough to deter the justices from deciding
for the state bank. The determining point in the outcome, as Clay
and several members of the court emphasized, was the practical
need to retain the general circulation of state paper. That would
hold true for a long while.
Though Clay had entered the political arena as a young man
at the beginning of the nineteenth century with strong reserva-
tions about the Federalist-sponsored First Bank of the United
States, even voting against renewal of its charter, he later became
a very important recruit among its supporters. His role also as a
regular attorney for the bank after 1815 was a substantial asset
for the corporation, and as a party leader he included the BUS as
a pillar in his economic policy, known as the American System.
During the early twenties as a lawyer, he contributed a great deal
to the rising strength of the institution. In state and national courts
he helped establish its valuable legal status.

NONCONSTITUTIONAL
BUSINESS
v3ome of Clay's legal practice involved constitutional questions,
such as the boundaries of state power over banking and con-
tracts, often in relation to national power. Notwithstanding the
great significance of these subjects, Clay and fellow lawyers par-
ticipated in many more nonconstitutional cases. The Supreme
Court in John Marshall's day (1801-35), for example, decided
twelve times as many nonconstitutional as constitutional questions.1
A frequent subject in that litigation was land. It arose from
disputes about titles administered by states and conveyances ac-
complished by sale or will, all in a bewildering, disorderly setting
of public policy. Clay's cases had these characteristics. His prepa-
ration and personal interest emphasized the relationship of the
law and land. It was here that his experience and skill advanced
his reputation at the bar. And more than his political service or
his own agricultural interest, this branch of legal business en-
hanced his income. In fact, much of it in the early years consisted
of large parcels of land instead of monetary fees from his clients.
Predictably, land law in early nineteenth-century America was
a mixture of the old and the new. What little the lawyers and
judges learned from professional instruction often drew upon
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English commentaries and reports, whose rules on tenancy, titles,
deeds, mortgages, and estates moved slowly away from feudal to
modern structures. An influence upon these pragmatic applica-
tions was a great variety of state land policies or lack of them. In
Kentucky and elsewhere the confusion of acquisition and use of
land generated complicated legal questions, as Clay's case of Green
v Biddle (1823) in the Supreme Court had illustrated. It was not
an isolated instance of these tangled systems, if one dare use the
term "system." Then an important national dimension was also
developing from congressional legislation on public lands, which
brought more problems.2
One of Clay's early land cases, McConnell v Brown (1821),
shows the complicated character of this part of his practice. In
1786 Edmund Taylor had received for his military service a Vir-
ginia grant of five thousand acres in Kentucky before its separa-
tion from the Old Dominion. His will provided that this land go
to his children in equal shares, and at Taylor's death his son sup-
posedly distributed it that way. Actually, other persons filed suit,
contending that the younger Taylor had also sold some tracts to
them. They prevailed in a county court against Clay's client, who
had relied upon the will, contrary to such transactions. But the
Kentucky appellate court reversed the decision. In rejecting Clay's
argument resting upon the validity of the will, the state chief
justice handed down an opinion that the entire bequest was void.
When the will for equal distribution of land among Taylor's chil-
dren was drawn up, he ruled, Virginia law required primogeni-
ture, all such inherited property to go to the eldest son. He had
violated that requirement by sale of some of the land. So Clay
lost his case, and both parties lost some land.3
Like many reports of this appellate court, there is no citation
to precedents or other authorities in the opinion. In fact, there is
little information on the substance of Clay's argument. But the
most interesting aspect of the outcome is the free judicial applica-
tion of the feudal rule of primogeniture in an American republic.
Another example of lingering premodern doctrine is Kirk v
Smith (1824)—and this in Marshall's Supreme Court. It involved
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extensive territory granted by the English crown in the seven-
teenth century to William Penn, the original proprietor of lands
that his grandson John Penn now claimed as manors, still subject
to the proprietary institution of quitrents. Killian Smith occu-
pied such a manor in York County, Pennsylvania after a success-
ful suit against another claimant, Caleb Kirk, in a federal circuit
court. Kirk had lost in his reliance upon state laws which confis-
cated extensive tracts held by loyalists during the Revolution.
Now he appealed to the Supreme Court and retained Clay and
Daniel Webster as his counsel to overturn that decision favoring
Smith and the proprietary interest.
Clay and Webster were well prepared. They made a full ex-
position of the relevant state legislation, especially a statute of
1779. Though they contended it rightly confiscated the propri-
etary interest and supported Kirk's claim, they suggested a mod-
est compromise to allow part of it to Penn and Smith. A fine
distinction could at least assure the occupancy and use of the
land to Kirk at issue in this case. It would only permit the propri-
etor to attempt to collect some quitrents from manors. That was
hardly promising to Smith and Penn, and their counsel so de-
clared in a negative reply.4
Marshall handed down the majority opinion, long-winded
and supportive of vested rights. After reviewing all relevant Penn-
sylvania statutes, especially the land-confiscation act of 1779, he
held they did not interfere with Smith's continued occupancy of
his manor, as granted by the Penns, who retained quitrent rights.
The chief justice found no constitutional issue in the controversy
and did not seriously examine the jurisdictional basis for hearing
the appeal, seemingly only the need for the high court to review
and affirm a decision for Smith by a lower federal tribunal. Only
Justice William Johnson dissented, yet so unclearly that his opin-
ion could have gone to either party.5
Overall, the importance of the case is to illustrate the Su-
preme Court's conservatism, adhering to old concepts in the im-
portant area of land law. In this instance, Marshall's approval of
Smith's existing possession of a proprietary manor, as decided by
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the circuit court, reflected judicial restraint favoring his vested
rights—not those of Clay's party, Kirk.
At the next term of the Court the lawyer fared better in
Elmendorf v Taylor (1825) concerning the validity of title to a
large tract of eight thousand acres in Kentucky, quaintly described
as located between Floyd's Fork and Bull Skin. Typical of that
period, this was a very uncertain boundary, though the record of
the case described it as having been surveyed many years earlier.
But an even greater problem was the admitted fact that Lucas
Elmendorf had never entered title at the land office. For that
reason he lost his claim in the federal circuit court. It was then
that Clay agreed to represent him in an appeal to the Supreme
Court. Argument by counsel and the chief justice's opinion were
lengthy, citing numerous authorities and precedents, more of this
by Marshall than one would have expected in view of his prefer-
ence for broad generalizations and principles.
The opinion closely followed Clay's reasoning that the valid-
ity of a title could depend only upon a survey, which announced
possession, fulfilled the essential legal requirement of notoriety
of ownership, and therefore justified the "presumption" it had
been recorded. It was quite a lenient decision.6
Some years later, Clay brought an unusual land case,
Livingston v Story (1835-37), up to the post-Marshall Court. It
arose in New Orleans and involved Edward Livingston, well-
known Jacksonian Democrat and distinguished compiler of the
civil law, which Louisiana had largely adopted instead of the com-
mon law found in the rest of the country. One of a prominent
New York family, Livingston not only had an important political
career in national office as senator, secretary of state, and minis-
ter to France but also had been quite active in the economic de-
velopment of New Orleans, including the strip along the
river-front levee, known as the batture. Pressed for capital in 1822,
he borrowed $23,000 from Benjamin Story on the security of
that property but did not repay the loan when it was due a year
later. So Story kept possession of the mortgaged land, increas-
ingly valuable due to an extensive program of constructing com-
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mercial buildings there. Despite not retiring the loan after a dozen
years, Livingston protested that Story had improperly collected
over $60,000 in rents and other profits from the tract.
Finally, he decided to file a bill of complaint in the federal
district court in the city for a decree ordering Story to return his
land and present an account of his profits. Livingston's motion
asked that the judge employ the procedure of equity, a branch of
the common law, in granting his request. The federal district judge
ruled that his court did not have jurisdiction for invoking equity
because his court had to employ procedures of the state's civil
code, not of the common law. So Livingston appealed that deci-
sion to the Supreme Court. Then Story asked Clay to argue his
defense at the 1835 term. A frequent visitor in New Orleans, with
friends and relatives there, the lawyer was pleased to be retained
in the case. Besides, he had no sympathy for Livingston, that min-
ion of President Andrew Jackson, his perennial political foe.7
At this hearing, Clay urged affirming the lower court's de-
cree, which denied jurisdiction. He emphasized an incompatibil-
ity of the equity procedures requested by Livingston and the
well-settled civil code prevailing in Louisiana. These two incon-
gruous legal systems could not operate together, and if compelled
to choose between them, the people of Louisiana would firmly
reject the common law, he declared.
Livingston's counsel concentrated on this jurisdictional ques-
tion. The federal court's ruling was wrong, they argued, because
it did have authority to employ the procedure of equity, granted
by several congressional laws from the admission of the state in
1812 to the present. On that ground the decision of the Supreme
Court went to Livingston, who could recover his land and money
from Story, Clay's client. This majority opinion in 1835 came
from Justice Smith Thompson, who had been Livingston's politi-
cal friend during their earlier days in New York.8
At the term two years later in 1837, the lawyers reargued
this question of jurisdictional boundaries, but with the same settle-
ment of the controversy. The majority opinion now came from
Justice James Wayne, another Jacksonian Democrat friendly to
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Livingston. On the other hand, Justice Henry Baldwin, Clay's
close friend, wrote a vigorous dissent, objecting to prejudicial
treatment of Story's rights and to substituting common-law rules
for the civil code in reluctant Louisiana. Political persuasions could
filter into the law. As for the financial impact, the decision or-
dered the district court to refer questions to an appointed master
in equity to make allowances for Livingston's previous payments
on the principal to Story, but also for Story's obligation now to
pay Livingston interest of eighteen percent for possession of the
property from 1823 to the present, 1837. Livingston himself did
not have the satisfaction of collecting that huge amount. He had
died the previous year.
As for the legal issues, congressional legislation on the state's
court system seems to have been sufficient to approve the district
court's use of common law and equity, contrary to Clay's deter-
mined arguments. The Constitution authorizes Congress to es-
tablish courts with broad judicial power over cases in law and
equity, arising under United States laws (article 3, sections 1 and
2). And Congress had passed laws from 1812 onward concern-
ing the courts within Louisiana. These measures were credibly
interpreted as assigning jurisdiction in cases of equity to them.
Furthermore, though federal circuit courts in much of the coun-
try had heard cases involving national law, federal district courts
in some states lacking a circuit judge increasingly did too. And
the Supreme Court now ruled in the Livingston case that the
district court in Louisiana could handle such cases in the absence
of a circuit court. It could therefore grant relief to Livingston.9
An ironic feature of this controversy had been Livingston's
resort to the common-law procedure of equity instead of the civil
code of the state, which represented much of his own expert con-
tribution. It would be interesting to know how he might have
explained this apparent inconsistency.
At this term, when he argued Livingston, Clay appeared in
another waterfront case. It was New Orleans v De Armas and
Cucullu, in which Clay's clients claimed land based upon an old
Spanish patent, upheld by the federal district court and a United
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States law. On the other side, the city also claimed it as the site of
a public wharf, protected by a superior authority of the treaty of
the Louisiana Purchase (1803). When Clay took the case to the
Supreme Court, he was able to build upon the chief justice's known
caution about judicial interference in diplomatic affairs, due to
constitutional separation of powers. Marshall predictably deliv-
ered an opinion that his court did not have jurisdiction in a law
suit to intervene in these kinds of legislative and executive spheres.
This meant he would not use the treaty to override the claims of
Armas and Cucullu, and Clay won his case.10
Additional legal business in Louisiana concerned his relatives,
James Brown and spouse, Ann Hart Brown, sister of Clay's wife
Lucretia. A well-to-do politician and lawyer, Brown had acquired
a good deal of land, including a plantation along the Mississippi
and much property in town. When he and Ann died in the early
1830s, Clay helped manage and professionally defend their es-
tates. He was executor of Ann's will, which had especially com-
plicated problems.
A determined challenge to Brown's holdings had begun even
before his death. Richard Keene filed suit against him in the fed-
eral district court in New Orleans. At issue was a contract be-
tween the two, which could transfer to him ownership of a
valuable plot along the levee. Clay argued a defense for Brown
against Keene, who failed to prove his diversity of citizenship
and the right to sue in an appeal to the Supreme Court. He per-
sisted in litigation for seven more years, then lost in another case.
Clay saved $35,000 for the Brown estate.11
Seventeen years passed before removal of the last barrier to a
final settlement of Ann Brown's estate, for which Clay was coun-
sel and still executor. She had bequeathed a sizeable sum to her
nephew John Humphreys, who, sad to say, did not live long
enough to collect it.12 It was, at last, possible to round out the
remainder of Ann's estate. Lucretia got something, and Clay did
too from his lawyer's fees. He shared that with his son Henry
Junior, now a fresh attorney in the closing phase of hearings.
Particularly in land cases turning on the administration of
Henry Clay the Lawyer
wills, Clay displayed a sound if not exhaustive command of the
relevant law. One that attracted popular attention was Singleton
v Singleton (1847). His suit in behalf of two children, aged eight
and eleven, challenged the will of their grandfather Jeconias, who
had devised his lands to the children's father, Elijah, as tenant for
life. The court of Woodford County, Kentucky, had decreed that
the will remained valid because children of such tender age could
not be parties in the case. Clay devoted an unusual amount of
time in presenting the suit before the state appellate court, which
reversed the lower court's decree by approving standing of the
children to challenge the will. It examined relevant state and
English laws in detail, more so than customary. One can believe
that the opinion borrowed liberally from Clay's extensive argu-
ment, though it was not reported.13
A selection of Clay's less prominent land cases shows charac-
teristics of his practice and relates to the legal history of his time.
He argued many of them in his state's high court but a number in
federal circuit and supreme courts.
One type of these suits in which Clay was counsel arose from
problems about early titles and boundaries of grants by Virginia
in the part of the West which later became the present states of
Ohio and Kentucky. Some of them concerned old land warrants,
awarded to veterans of military service during the Revolution.
The area lay north of the Ohio River between its branches, the
Little Miami and the Scioto. But exact locations were unclear
and often disputed, even after federal surveys, reports, and legis-
lation. Receiving a large fee of four hundred acres out of a claim
of seven hundred, Clay successfully carried Doddridge v Thomp-
son (1824) to the Supreme Court. Marshall's long opinion, in-
cluding a history of the military tracts, came to conclusions
favorable to the claims of veterans. He was, of course, a Revolu-
tionary veteran himself. At any rate, he held that, though lacking
concrete proof, the general rule in these questions must be to
assume that claims had been made in timely fashion prior to con-
gressional legislation on the subject, as required. It could have
been a dubious assumption.14
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Marshall's perspective brought another loose-construction-
ist decision on military warrants, which Clay had successfully
argued in the federal circuit of Ohio, though not appearing in the
appeal to the Supreme Court. Taylor v Myers (1822) upheld the
right of a person who was not the original holder of a land war-
rant to acquire land abandoned by a military grantee, and to do
so even after passage of a law that would make the purchase too
late. The right of abandonment, he held, must prevail over the
statutory restriction. This interpretation opened more opportuni-
ties for transactions of speculators, such as Clay's party in the case.15
In several land cases Clay did not win or lose completely. It
was characteristic of the judicial process in those days to use
courts as mediators to accommodate rights and interests of op-
posing parties, especially concerning contracts and debts. As the
lawyer once remarked in arguing a complex case, it was "a con-
test of two equities." Litigation moved slowly over as much as
ten or twenty years, sometimes where tangled and puzzling evi-
dence hindered a fair result. Such seemed true in Watts v Waddle
(1832), involving town lots in Chillicothe. Clay's client, Watts,
got a judgment in the Supreme Court, but Waddle got credit for
rents and profits. That had been the kind of outcome Clay would
soon see in Livingston. Decisions could amount to a "compro-
mise."16 It was so expressed in the state appellate court reporter's
headnote for Bates v Todd's Heirs (1823), a difficult case, de-
pending upon a promised transfer of 6,000 acres in Fayette
County. Only a portion of the disputed tract went to each party.17
A similar approach could apply to a division of sizeable court
costs between litigants. That happened in unusual cross appeals
by Clay and by a claimant on the other side of a controversy over
land at the mouth of Green River, valued at $100,000. After he
had been counsel in the case, the court appointed him the trustee
to settle an involved estate. His opponent, Samuel Hopkins, had
acquired only a parcel of it and now sued Clay for the way he
executed the trust's terms. The judge was apparently so uncer-
tain about this question that he ordered Clay and Hopkins to
split the court costs.18
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While his nonconstitutional cases often involved land, reflect-
ing his special interest, there were, of course, other branches of
his practice. A number concerned actions in debt during the early
twenties, a period of hard times when debtors obtained judicial
replevins, which postponed payment of obligations. Though Clay
did not ordinarily favor such a policy, he represented some cli-
ents seeking such relief. Others were officials, such as sheriffs,
arrayed against them. And in the early twenties he gave his prin-
cipal attention to representing the national bank in Ohio and
Kentucky in its massive effort to collect debts.
An interesting problem about a debt arose from its connec-
tion with Thomas Jefferson and lingered for several years. Clay
received a letter from the aged ex-president, desperately urging
him to sue a well-known Kentuckian, Thomas Owings, to collect
an obligation of about $50,000. Jefferson and his grandson Tho-
mas Mann Randolph had endorsed notes for Randolph's father-
in-law, Wilson Cary Nicholas, in terrible financial shape when
he died. Nicholas had transferred these notes as a loan to Owings,
also out of pocket. Left with his commitment in the endorse-
ment, Jefferson feared he would be ruined, hard-pressed as he
had been and would increasingly become.
Clay agreed to take the case to the federal district court of
Kentucky, where he eventually won a hollow victory. All he gained
was the solace of an assignment of the worthless notes to an-
other person. Despite the decision, Owings had been unable and
unwilling to redeem them. Jefferson had not extricated himself
from the financial depths and had been dead for several years.19
Rarely taking criminal cases, the lawyer did have a few. He
felt obliged to take one at the urging of his longtime associate in
law and politics Robert Wickliffe, who was a candidate for the
state legislature in 1829. Wickliffe's opponent, John M. McCalla,
had published a severe attack upon him anonymously in the Lex-
ington Kentucky Gazette. Wickliffe's son, Charles, defended his
father's reputation with more than a little zeal. He demanded
that Thomas Benning, editor of the newspaper, reveal the author's
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name. A refusal to identify the writer as McCalla degenerated
into a hot quarrel, which ended in young Wickliffe's shooting
Benning dead and being charged with murder.
Clay hesitated to defend Charles, partly because of his long
concentration on other branches of law but mainly because he
recognized the damage it might cause him and his political friends
to join such a rash foray. But he yielded to the elder Wickliffe's
pleas as a necessity.
At the trial of five days, Clay displayed his oratorical skills
by mimicking McCalla, a small man, by bending over to accen-
tuate his short appearance, by speaking with a weak voice, and
by asking the jury, according to an observer's account: "Who is
Dentatus [the pseudonym used in the newspaper to attack
Wickliffe]? Why, gentlemen, it is nobody but little Johnny
McCalla!" Clay pictured Charles's act of shooting Benning as
self-defense, a natural right of every person. Perhaps he made an
impression with this point, since in his argument with Wickliffe,
the editor had brandished his cane. That reaction could have been
Benning's self-defense too. At any rate, the jury was out very
briefly and returned a verdict of not guilty. Clay emerged with a
good feeling about his success at the trial, as well as believing he
had gained, not lost, politically. "I have greatly benefited by it, in
this State," he said, "instead of being injuriously affected."
This did not conclude the ugly episode. Wickliffe challenged
Benning's successor at the newspaper, George Trotter, to a duel
after being called a murderer. This time, Charles lost. Trotter
killed him. As a duelist himself, Clay did not dwell upon the
bloody results of the controversy.20
Charles's brother, Robert Junior, was also short-tempered and
involved in a dispute, leading to another criminal case. He clashed
with Cassius Clay, Henry's distant relative, in an intraparty con-
flict of Whigs. The conservative Robert and the maverick Cassius
had dueled but missed their shots—only the beginning of violent
confrontation. Cassius continued to stir angry feelings because
of his staunch antislavery advocacy. During the campaign of 1843,
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he repeatedly interrupted speeches of young Wickliffe, who re-
sorted to another tactic to quiet this disagreeable nuisance by
hiring a burly character, Sam Brown, to incite Cassius into a fight
and to resort to a gun as needed. At a political gathering, Brown
followed the plan and fired at Cassius, only to have the bullet
harmlessly hit a metallic object on his adversary's chest. Where-
upon Cassius spiritedly counterattacked with a knife he had hand-
ily brought along and cut up Brown rather badly. If someone,
whether Cassius or Brown's friends, had not rolled Brown into
the water of a nearby ravine, it was said, that would have been
the last of him.
Cassius had survived, but he was indicted for committing the
crime of mayhem. He brought in Henry Clay to defend him at
his trial, notwithstanding Clay's earlier connections with the
Wickliffes. In court, the lawyer relied upon self-defense as mo-
tive. He said Brown had aggressively called Cassius a liar to pre-
cipitate violence and had met a just response. For the state, the
prosecutor blamed Cassius for instigating the encounter by hurl-
ing insults and flourishing a horse whip. According to later ac-
counts of the trial, Clay's summation to the jury was eloquent
and scathing, if not legalistic. His client could do no less than he
did to repel aggression, he contended. A newspaper reporter
quoted his concluding statement: "And, if he had not, he would
not have been worthy of the name which he bears!" The attor-
ney would not always take such pride in a connection with his
volatile relative, Cassius Clay. But at the moment he was pleased
with a verdict of innocence.21
Though Clay took the two Wickliffe criminal cases, they were
exceptions to his primary interest as a lawyer. And at a time when
others at the bar were handling much litigation on maritime is-
sues, such as prizes, he had only one, Apollon, Edon, Claimant
(1824) in the Supreme Court. He won damages from a federal
collector's illegal seizure of a ship's cargo beyond the interna-
tional boundary.22 Another exception could have been the im-
portant subject of Indian rights, such as the cause of the Cherokees
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in Georgia, for whom he frequently expressed his support; how-
ever, he did not agree to defend their rights in prominent cases
during the early thirties.23
Thus Clay's attention in nonconstitutional business usually went
to questions about land or debt, areas where he was quite com-
petent, as well as likely to collect sizeable fees. Americans were
acquiring land by purchase, free-wheeling settlement, or inherit-
ance. And with the land came uncertainties of title and location.
The law regulating all this real estate was often similarly uncer-
tain. Lawyers like Clay, in handling questions on land, drew upon
the common law in English treatises, a few judicial reports, and
scattered legislation. But this ancient body of law going back to
feudalism needed to be balanced with new perspectives in a re-
publican society.
As some of Clay's cases illustrate, courts sometimes tipped
the balance in favor of ancient principles. In McConnell (1812),
for example, the Kentucky Court of Appeals held for the inheri-
tors of a large parcel of land because their right to the property
rested upon the old Virginia requirement of primogeniture, in
effect at the time of a will and applied at this late date. The same
kind of dependence on ancient principles characterized Kirk v
Smith (1824) in the Supreme Court. Clay and Webster, as coun-
sel for Kirk, unsuccessfully challenged the long established pro-
prietary interest of the Penn family in manors. Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion for the Court respected remnants of William
Penn's feudal right to quitrents, conferred a century and a half
earlier. Similarly, the Court's decision in New Orleans v De Armas
and Cucullu (1835) was another instance of an old legal interest
thwarting modern challenges. In that case, Clay's clients, holding
waterfront land by an ancient Spanish title in that city, prevailed
against the municipal government's aim of occupying the land
for new public facilities—notwithstanding the city's reliance upon
the Louisiana Treaty of 1803 and a subsequent congressional
law that transferred the territory to the United States. Chief Jus-
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tice Marshall's ruling that the Court could not intervene not only
confirmed old property rights of the defendants but specifically
reflected Marshall's known reluctance for the Court to interfere
in diplomatic policy.
While Clay continued to specialize in land questions, of course
he had other types of business. There were some interesting and
profitable cases involving wills. He earned sizeable fees in the
protracted litigation concerning wills of his relatives, James and
Ann Brown. It required stubborn but personally satisfying work.
Still, his volunteer effort in behalf of the Singleton orphans to
rescue a decision for their inheritance, was undoubtedly satisfy-
ing too. Then there were clients getting his help on problems of
debt. A pitiful example was the sad situation of old Thomas
Jefferson whose unwise financial obligations persisted even after
his death.
Though he did not have unusual expertise in criminal law,
Clay did take a few such cases. In his representation of the duel-
ing young Wickliffes and his maverick relative, Cassius, Clay dis-
played the flashy techniques in addressing judge and jury he had
developed in his younger years. His style of oratory and dra-
matic sense crowded out a more sober role in this setting. The
result was less than perfect justice. But here, as in Clay's defense
of Aaron Burr in the first stage of his treason trial, Clay was an
able advocate.
In contrast to other lawyers, such as Webster, he did not have
any noteworthy cases of maritime questions, perhaps because his
home base was located in the interior of the country. Nevertheless,
he did have more than a little preparation on this subject, gained
from his diplomatic service after the War of 1812 and from his
substantial experience as secretary of state in the twenties.
His contemporaries may have wondered why he did not par-
ticipate in defense of the Cherokees, whose harsh treatment he
deplored in and out of Congress. Even now, this is an appropri-
ate question. Likewise, one can pose the same sort of question
about his circumspection on problems of slavery as a lawyer.
SLAVERY
Lsawyers in antebellum America often addressed the rising ques-
tion of slavery. Whether they were also active politicians or mainly
lawyers, they encountered problems caused by the so-called pe-
culiar institution. This was true of Clay. As politician, he faced
congressional controversies about slavery in western territories
and displayed an uncommon ability to forge national compro-
mises. As lawyer in local and federal courts, he had professional
business relating to slavery, and he showed his characteristic cau-
tion in handling it. The more so, because he was himself a large
slaveholder.
During the final phase of his practice, the issue had reached a
critical stage, threatening republican principles and the strength
of the union. Not only confronting political crises, such as those
about state power to nullify national legislation or about west-
ern expansion, Clay also struggled with sensitive legal issues about
slavery.
That was the situation in Groves v Slaughter (1841), a case
in the Supreme Court concerning the interstate slave trade.1 People
in Mississippi had become alarmed by a large importation of
slaves for work in its extensive cotton fields. To members of a
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state constitutional convention in 1832, this traffic seemed to be
dumping undesirable and dangerous workers from older states.
There was a feeling, as well, that it drained capital from Missis-
sippi. So the convention placed an article in the document pro-
hibiting introduction of more slaves for sale after the coming
year, though it did allow owners who were new settlers to bring
their own slaves into the state. This constitution did not specify
whether the article was self-enforcing or required subsequent
action by the legislature. At any rate, that body did not enact a
law on the subject until 1837.
Meanwhile in 1836 Robert Slaughter, an out-of-state trader,
had exported a large number of slaves into Mississippi. In mak-
ing the transaction, he received a promissory note, endorsed by
Moses Groves, also a nonresident of the state. But a suit in the
federal circuit court followed when Groves refused to pay on the
note because, he reasoned, such sales were illegal according to
the provision in the state constitution. Slaughter responded that
the sale had been made before the legislature had passed a neces-
sary statute in 1837 enforcing the prohibition. The state consti-
tution on the point, he said, was not self-executing, so that his
sale during the previous year was still legal. Groves, he contended,
should pay on the endorsement. The federal court agreed. Where-
upon, Groves appealed to the Supreme Court, with a hearing
scheduled in the 1841 term.
Slaughter and a partner now asked Clay to represent them in
what would turn out to be an intricate and important case, both
economically and legally. In January, soon after the Log Cabin
victory of his Whigs in the election of 1840, Clay was busy in the
Senate preparing an agenda for the incoming Harrison adminis-
tration. Yet he found time to take the case with a sizeable fee on
the contingency of winning a judgment from the justices holding
court down in the Capitol basement.2
On February 20, 1841, Robert Walker, a prominent states'
rights Democrat, opened the hearing as counsel for Groves with
a staunch defense of the state's policy prohibiting importation of
slaves for sale. The most wicked and dangerous of them could
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contaminate the whole slave population, he warned. He also pre-
dicted trouble from agitators who would stir up discontent if the
state were open to an unrestricted slave trade. Still another dan-
ger would follow judicial disapproval of the state's regulations: it
would allow Congress to trample upon states' rights, dear to
Walker's heart. Here he argued vigorously against application of
the national commerce power to interfere with the state's inter-
nal affairs. His most persuasive point was a citation to many
laws of other states, similar to those of Mississippi. In general,
Walker's approach was exhaustive and his tone emotional. He
later submitted a long written version to the court reporter, Rich-
ard Peters, who incorporated it as an appendix to the current
volume of Supreme Court reports.3
Henry Gilpin also represented Groves and justified the state
constitutional convention's provision as self-enforcing in prohib-
iting importation of slaves for sale. No matter that a statute had
not been adopted before Slaughter's transaction. Here he con-
ceded he had to rely upon common sense for this interpretation.
He, too, rejected any use of the congressional power to regulate
commerce as destructive of Mississippi's sovereignty over its do-
mestic institutions. Interestingly, even fifty years after the adop-
tion of the United States Constitution, Gilpin, the nation's attorney
general, could expound concurrent state rather than broad fed-
eral regulation of interstate commerce. But in those days, that
officer still had a private practice as well as duties for the na-
tional government. So Gilpin could express his own constitu-
tional tenets of strict construction.4
Clay's longtime friend and veteran lawyer Walter Jones be-
gan argument for Slaughter. He insisted that the state constitu-
tional article (1832) by itself, without an enforcing statute (none
till 1837), was insufficient authority to prohibit Slaughter's slave
sales (1836). And he was confident that when the statute was
passed in 1837, it could not abrogate this earlier contract be-
tween Slaughter and Groves, for precedents of the Supreme Court
on the contract clause of the United States Constitution prohib-
ited state measures affecting agreements retrospectively. After a
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short presentation, Jones closed. He did not wish to dominate
strategy for the defendant by crowding out his associates, Clay
and Daniel Webster. He magnanimously remarked he would leave
basic constitutional questions of the case to "the Ajax [Webster]
and Achilles [Clay] of the bar."5
In his turn, Clay strengthened the objection to accepting the
state constitutional article alone. If it were so accepted, he pre-
dicted, serious consequences would follow. Large numbers of
slaves would be cast loose and would pose a serious threat to
security, he warned. Nothing had been done to avoid this contin-
gency, which might escalate to a "servile war." Legally, he believed
the effect would be an unjust confiscation of a huge amount of
slave owners' property. And it would be retrospective action, though
he did not further develop the argument based upon the federal
contract clause. Speaking from personal knowledge, however, he
pointed out that the same kind of provision on importation of
slaves in the Kentucky constitution had not allowed its operation
in that state without appropriate legislation. The Mississippi legis-
lature had finally done so, but after Slaughter's shipment.
As other counsel and some of the justices would do, Clay
discussed the relevance of the constitutional power of Congress
to regulate interstate commerce. Should the Court rule that the
Mississippi policy interfered with it? He answered yes, for Con-
gress had an "exclusive power." He did not elaborate this asser-
tion by citing cases or exploring constitutional theory beyond an
emphatic charge that the existing prohibition of importing slaves
was on the "abolition side" of the question and confiscated a
very important form of property. Anyway, he declared, abolition
was not a legitimate regulation of commerce but an "annihila-
tion" of it. Clearly, he would also not approve Congress's using
its commerce power to weaken the right to conduct the interstate
slave trade. He had elaborated that view in the Senate and would
repeat it in the future.6
Aroused by the role of the Mississippi courts in approving
the state's exclusion of slave imports, he directed an emotional
blow against their competence—an interesting foray against the
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judicial system there in contrast to acceptable systems in this coun-
try generally. "Who are the judges of the Courts of Mississippi,
and what is the tenure of their offices? They are elected by the
people; and the judges so elected form the Court of Errors, and a
Court thus constituted is called upon to decide a case affecting a
large portion of the citizens of that state, in which strangers to
the state, and those who have no influence in their appointment,
are claimants! The judges of Mississippi are sitting in their own
cause; in the cause of those around them; of those who gave and
can take away their offices! . . . I hope never to live in a state
where the judges are elected, and where the period for which
they hold their offices is limited, so that elections are constantly
recurring."7
Webster closed the argument for Slaughter by reiterating the
point that the Mississippi constitutional article was not self-en-
forcing, only authorizing later legislative action. But he focused
on the commerce clause of the federal Constitution. Like Clay,
he subscribed to an exclusive congressional power, though not to
interfere with the slave trade. He cited the steamboat-monopoly
case of Gibbons v Ogden (1824) as ruling that Congress had
complete power over commerce among the states, and they had
none. If Congress did not legislate on a subject, it was meant to
be free, he contended. According to this formula, only the subor-
dinate and unclear police power for health and safety remained
to the states, Webster said. However well-informed in constitu-
tional law the lawyer was, he did not accurately describe the less
extensive character of the Gibbons decision, which did not lay
down an exclusive national commerce power. This despite his
own important participation as counsel in that case. The division
of the commerce power between national and state governments
continued to be an open question. And the present disposition of
Groves demonstrated it was.8
Another feature of the arguments of Clay and Webster was
their description of slaves as property. While not a new concept
in antebellum years, it was now gaining a broader significance.
Slaves were a peculiar kind of property not to be arbitrarily seized
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or devalued by government. The state's denial of Slaughter's right
to be protected from deprivation of his slave property was un-
constitutional, the attorneys reasoned. Such an interpretation had
developed from the "law of the land" clause in England's ancient
Magna Carta, limiting royal power, later in state constitutions
and the Fifth Amendment of the national Constitution, expressed
as "due process of law." Justice Baldwin would employ that con-
cept in his concurring opinion.
The Supreme Court splintered in its disposition of the case.
Two justices out of the nine did not participate: John Catron was
ill, and Philip Barbour had died before the decision. Two others,
Joseph Story and John McKinley, did not file opinions but were
listed by the Court reporter as dissenting. In an opinion for the
Court, Smith Thompson therefore spoke for no more than a bare
majority of five out of nine members. He took a restrained posi-
tion by holding only that the Mississippi constitution was not
self-executing and that the legislature had not enacted the neces-
sary implementing statute to bar importation of slaves from other
states. To that extent he held for Slaughter, Clay's client. He went
no further and did not comment on other more fundamental
questions, whether the state was invading congressional power
over interstate commerce, whether it was depriving Slaughter of
his property in slaves, or whether the Supreme Court was bound
to follow the Mississippi state courts' decisions relevant to the
present issues, indeed whether they were clearly formulated.9
James Wayne was silent, but his proslavery sensitivity and disap-
proval of judicial intervention into the institution were well
known. He gladly accepted Thompson's cautious approach. Henry
Baldwin concurred but wrote a separate opinion with his own
reasons, much bolder than Thompson's and resembling Clay's
argument against the state's policy.10 Roger Taney was stirred to
rebuff strong statements by Baldwin and John McLean for a broad
congressional commerce power. Otherwise, he approved Thomp-
son's guarded strategy.11
Although Clay won his case, the decision was narrow and
unclear. No more than one justice, probably Wayne, concurred
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entirely with Thompson's opinion, which therefore invited dis-
agreement and noncompliance in the state. And that is exactly
what happened. The Mississippi Court of Appeals had already
held that the state constitution was self-enforcing and persisted
in disputing Groves over the next several years. During argu-
ment in the case, Webster had urged the Supreme Court in vain
to give no weight to such state decisions on this subject because
they were not only premature but exceeded their jurisdiction.12
Finally in Rowan v Runnels (1847), the Supreme Court,
speaking through Taney, did repel this opposition to its author-
ity. He rejected an effort by the state judiciary to bypass the Groves
ruling.13 Dissatisfaction in Mississippi about the inflow of slaves
continued for some time. Slaves, such as those marketed by
Slaughter, were brought into the state for sale in large numbers
in defiance of several state laws. Still, debts due to slave traders
like Slaughter were often not paid. There must have been a feel-
ing of futility by people on both sides of this controversy.
Groves had an untidy impact upon issues about slavery. Some
justices supported national power to check its spread, and others
opposed it. In this sense, the case ventilated a significant ques-
tion in antebellum politics. While the legal status of slaves as
property was becoming more important, there was here an early
suggestion that the constitutional concept of due process of law
was relevant. Later it was indeed relevant in the Dred Scott deci-
sion of 1857.14
More to the point, in Groves the Court explored how far
and where the constitutional power to regulate commerce ex-
tended. Thompson's official opinion evaded a direct answer to
this basic question. The other justices scattered: Story and McLean
for an exclusive national power; Taney for state concurrent au-
thority; and others for partial regulation at the two levels. Law-
yers also differed—Webster for national and Walker for state
power, others somewhere in between. So if Groves seemed to be
chiefly a slavery case, it was also a highlight in the lively debate
about commercial regulation. This development would reach a
tentative resolution ten years later in the judicial compromise of
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Cooley v Wardens (1851), allowing state concurrent regulation
of some branches of interstate commerce but asserting exclusive
national power over others found to be important "higher
branches."15
Despite Clay's argument in Groves for extensive congressional
power over interstate commerce, he conceded Congress could
not interfere with intrastate commerce in slaves. And several years
earlier in the Senate, he had denied favoring any national legisla-
tion restricting either level of slave trading, federal or state. In
presenting a series of proslavery resolutions, John Calhoun had
charged that Clay approved such regulations. The Kentuckian
responded with his own resolutions setting forth a categorical
disclaimer: "The Constitution provides no power to prohibit the
slave trade or movement of slaves within and between slave-hold-
ing states."16 Though Clay's resolutions did not pass, general sen-
timent in this period probably opposed any regulation of the
interstate slave trade.
There were more exchanges on the subject, one of which
occurred immediately after the Groves decision of 1841. In the
lame-duck days before the new Harrison administration took
office, Webster, who had been appointed secretary of state, sent
the Senate his resignation as a member. An inveterate opponent,
Alfred Cuthbert, who was quite upset but not well informed about
the Groves hearing, rose to deplore Webster's absence from the
chamber. He demanded that the lawyer explain to the Senate his
negative views on states' rights and slavery, which Cuthbert be-
lieved would now detract from his fitness for the cabinet ap-
pointment. As a fellow Whig and co-counsel with Webster in
Groves, Clay disputed this indictment by warmly insisting nei-
ther he nor Webster had ever subscribed to federal intervention
in this area of states' rights. He even took the further step of
saying he thought Congress had the positive power to remove
obstacles to the movement of slaves across state lines.17
The problem arising from Slaughter's slave trading did not
disappear. Up to the outbreak of the Civil War, this aspect of
slavery was a target of abolitionists and non-extensionists de-
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spite whatever the Supreme Court said. Free Soilers and Repub-
licans sought to stop slave trading as a blot on the national char-
acter that ought not be tolerated, and they believed it could be
done constitutionally. This inflamed the southern "slave power"
as an insupportable and illegal assault against its "peculiar insti-
tution." Supreme Court decisions and northern compromisers
could not calm the alarm spreading across the South. The politi-
cal direction the issues of the Groves case would finally take re-
mained to be seen. At the moment, that direction seemed to favor
the slavery interest.18
Though now a compromiser, carefully addressing the ques-
tion of slavery in this stage of his political career, Clay had taken
a stronger stand on it as a young man in frontier Kentucky. He
had then sought but failed to get adoption of a policy of gradual
emancipation to be inserted in the state constitution. Later, as
president of the American Colonization Society, he confirmed
his long-time association with the policy of removal to Africa.
Now in arguing Groves he demonstrated his retreat from serious
reform, politically and constitutionally.

7OVERVIEW
lay's experience in the world of lawyers and judges extended
from his apprenticeship as a boy of fourteen with the learned
Chancellor George Wythe, then with state Attorney General
Robert Brooke in Richmond, Virginia, and through a very long
practice until his death more than fifty years later. Contrary to a
common misconception about Clay's preparation as a lawyer, it
was quite good in the circumstances. And after his admission to
the Kentucky bar in 1798 until his death in 1852, he blended an
active business in court with a long involvement in politics. He
competed well with opposing counsel in grasp of fundamentals
without excessive reliance upon his oratorical skills.1 His corre-
spondence and the court reports show close attention to factual
details and a sure understanding of broad issues. Furthermore,
Clay became one of the most important political figures of those
decades, combining dual roles in law and public affairs. Each
affected the other.
Energy and ambition, as well as a fortunate setting in the
thriving western town of Lexington, helped him rise socially as a
member of the prominent Hart family and advance profession-
ally. Always a spur to his practice of law was his strong interest
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in fees he could collect, frequently in property in addition to cash,
evident in his sizeable holdings of real estate, town lots and build-
ings, but particularly huge chunks of frontier land.
True enough, there were periods of little or no business in
the courts, usually due to his political commitments. And when
he returned to the bar, his feelings were guarded about reentry.
There were moments when he looked back upon his early prepa-
ration as being limited. Still, these were passing exceptions in his
own views about a professional career.2 And certainly one does
not find evidence that his contemporaries had anything but ample
respect for his ability as a lawyer.
Clay's expertise in land law developed rapidly and never de-
clined. Legal business in Kentucky and other western areas was
brisk and complicated. Questions about titles, sales, and wills
were quite challenging because early surveying and record keep-
ing had been careless or nonexistent. If a lawyer was knowledge-
able about this blurred subject, however, he could succeed and
profit well indeed.
An important constitutional case, Green v Biddle (1824), il-
lustrates the problem. Occupants of large areas of Kentucky had
inadequate proof of land ownership, claimed by absentee Virgin-
ians who relied upon old grants issued wholesale by their legisla-
ture when Kentucky had been its western county. Later, Kentucky
passed laws to protect and compensate the occupants, but Vir-
ginia persisted in supporting its claimants, so that the two states
were arrayed against each other. Clay's effort for a political com-
promise met the Old Dominion's rebuff. And he lost in his resort
to the Supreme Court, though another case finally allowed some
relief from absentee claims. Nevertheless, Green had inflamed
Clay and his friends, who strongly objected to this extension of
the Constitution's contract clause to monitor interstate agree-
ments judicially. Nowadays, a different procedure for state com-
pacts prevails.
Additional land cases required detailed preparation. Kirk v
Smith (1824) depended on the relevance of William Penn's origi-
nal proprietary rights in Pennsylvania, and Livingston v Story
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(1835-37) concerned land along the New Orleans levee, held by
his longtime Democratic adversary Edward Livingston. Though
the lawyer showed a sure grasp of land law, he lost both deci-
sions. In Kirk the Supreme Court upheld old proprietary rights.
In Livingston it allowed the common-law judicial procedure of
equity relief instead of the civil code of Louisiana, upon which
Clay had relied. He argued many other land questions, most of
them nonconstitutional, in which federal and state tribunals in-
clined toward antiquated authorities in behalf of vested rights
but for free enterprise as well. That was true of those in which
Chief Justice Marshall delivered majority opinions.
A significant case defining the contract clause was Odgen v
Saunders (1824-27). Interpreting the Constitution's provision that
prohibits states from impairing the obligation of contracts (ar-
ticle 1, section 10), the justices applied it against retrospective
bankruptcy laws but approved legislation on future contracts. In
a very important second hearing they disapproved interstate ex-
tension of a state's measure on bankruptcy. This condition re-
duced state action and protected a developing national economy.
Clay uncharacteristically argued Ogden on the side of state
power. He probably took the case because he and others in Con-
gress had not yet succeeded in passing a national bankruptcy
statute. So despite his firm nationalism, he urged desirable state
action to fill a void in the sphere of economic growth. Though
Marshall filed a rare dissent, even arguing against a partial state
power, the Court did move the contract clause toward the later
broad versions of constitutional due-process clauses, which would
be invoked against legislation, state or national, retrospective or
prospective. As for bankruptcy policy, with brief exceptions Clay's
hopes for national laws were not fulfilled through the nineteenth
century.
As a lawyer-politician, he had a great interest in banking.
When he first became active in public affairs of Kentucky, he had
much to do with the state banks there, in fact by serving as an
officer and a counsel of these institutions. In Congress he did
display his early version of Jeffersonianism by opposing rechar-
106 Henry Clay the Lawyer
ter of the Bank of the United States in 1811, but he soon changed
his mind during the surge of nationalism after 1815. And from
that time forward he was one of the staunchest advocates of na-
tional banking. This position was reflected in congressional poli-
tics and in his personal dependence upon the bank for loans.
Still, he could later gain more constitutional room for state banks
too in winning Briscoe v Kentucky (1837), in which he also had
a personal interest. As an attorney for the BUS in the 1820s, he
supervised collection of debts in Ohio and Kentucky, which in-
volved going into courts constantly for judicial executions of fore-
closure, successfully in nearly all instances but not necessarily
resulting in timely collections.
The negative effects upon opinion toward this corporation
in Ohio led into the well-known case of Osborn v BUS (1824).
Clay organized and implemented the legal strategy to get judg-
ment against an Ohio tax, intended to force the bank out of that
state; and in the process he got a lower federal court ruling that
this was a suit against an individual official, Ralph Osborn, not
against the state of Ohio, which had claimed protection of the
Eleventh Amendment as a version of its sovereign immunity. From
here the question proceeded to the Supreme Court, where Chief
Justice Marshall affirmed the circuit court's holding for the bank.
The precedent of Osborn would be a possible but not sure weapon
against states in the future. Public policy might be overturned by
suit nominally against an official but actually against a state. Yet
the dividing line now, as in Clay's time, is fuzzy. Almost as a
matter of course, Marshall reiterated his classic pronouncement
in McCulloch v Maryland (1819) that the bank was both neces-
sary and constitutional. Obviously, Clay's victory here did not
persuade anti-bank Jacksonian politicians in the future to accept
the existence and utility of a national bank.
Like some of his cases on banking and land, another subject
involving the relation of law and politics was slavery, demon-
strated in Groves v Slaughter (1841). The circumstances surround-
ing this controversy developed in an effort by Mississippi to close
off the importation of slaves from other states. Robert Slaughter
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defied that policy and retained Clay and Webster in his appeal to
the Supreme Court. Technically, the two lawyers argued that the
state's constitutional provision forbidding slave imports was in-
operable without enforcing legislation. And that was the point
accepted by the majority opinion. But more significant were other
arguments of counsel and opinions of several justices, ranging
across broader issues, however nonessential they were to dispos-
ing of the case before them. Both Clay and Webster contended
interstate commerce in slaves was constitutionally immune from
both state and national interference. States could not prohibit it
because the regulation of interstate commerce was an exclusive
national power, they ventured to say, while Congress could not
prohibit it because doing so would be an unconstitutional depri-
vation of a special kind of property. But the two lawyers could
not recruit a united opinion from the bench on these points.
Nonetheless, Slaughter was a revealing exploration of the consti-
tutional options concerning slavery at a time it had become a
crucial question.
Exceptions to the economic questions that Clay emphasized
as a lawyer were a much smaller number of criminal cases. Occa-
sionally during his early years, he represented persons accused of
assault or murder. In his usual role as defense attorney, he seemed
to depend a good deal upon his striking presence, his wit and
eloquence. And he might have carried the jury further than the
facts or the law justified in winning a verdict for a guilty client.
That was probably true of his defense of young Charles Wickliffe
and of Cassius Clay in the final phase of his practice.
By far, his best known criminal case had been to represent
Aaron Burr in the lower federal court's hearings on charges of
treason. At first, utterly convinced of Burr's innocence, Clay al-
lowed his own personal feelings to get the better of him. He looked
at the prosecution as a Federalist attack upon this prominent
Republican. Nevertheless, he could not be faulted for success-
fully insisting on fair procedure by the grand jury. Aside from his
gullibility about Burr's character, he was on good ground with
respect to the constitutional rights of the accused. But Clay's readi-
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ness afterward in Washington to fall immediately in line with
President Jefferson's biased management of the Burr trial for trea-
son was also influenced by politics beyond sober legal principles.
Clay had been more or less active in the practice of law over
a long while, with some diversions when his political commit-
ments prevented it, such as during the War of 1812 and its after-
math when congressional and diplomatic service absorbed his
attention, or later when he served as John Quincy Adams's secre-
tary of state in the late twenties. Otherwise he regularly traveled
to Washington to appear before the Supreme Court and also to
serve in Congress, besides conducting business in state tribunals.
Well known as he was throughout the country, it was not
surprising for him to receive earnest requests from young per-
sons to receive his instruction in the law. He regretfully declined
but replied with lengthy advice about locating an office. He por-
trayed Kentucky, especially Lexington, as an ideal place to set up
practice. Cincinnati and New Orleans were also strongly recom-
mended. Obviously he demonstrated his own satisfaction in his
past travel there.3
During these periods of nonappearance in courts, he prob-
ably misrepresented his situation, for when he was not prevented
by other obligations, he returned to practice, despite leading his
young correspondents to believe he might never return to the
bar. At any rate, he took such occasions to offer extensive advice
on professional and personal conduct.4
He also expressed his views to his son Henry Junior, who
was uncertain about what direction he should take after gradua-
tion from the military academy at West Point. Clay favored a
legal career decidedly and suggested a course of study for prepa-
ration and good locations to set up an office.5 Young Henry took
his father's counsel, though he later entered active military ser-
vice and died during the Mexican War.
Even in the last months of his life in 1852 at age seventy-five
when he lay dying in a Washington hotel room, Clay had some
cases in progress. Too ill to appear in court, he had submitted
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briefs for other counsel to argue. In his last correspondence to
his wife, he proudly reported he had received a fee of $2,500 in
winning a suit in the Supreme Court, his reason for going to the
capital. He remained quite interested in his remuneration, which
had usually been liberal. Yet when he looked back upon his legal
career, Clay could also feel satisfied with its character and qual-
ity during a formative era of American law.6
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volume for 1821, but there is for 1821 as well as 1823 after a second
hearing. See 8 Wheaton 108 (1823) and the discussion below for the
first hearing. For an informative comment on the procedure of amicus
curiae, see Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, "Henry Clay and the Supreme
Court," The Register of the Kentucky Historical Society 94 (Autumn
1996): 353-62, remarking that this procedure was novel in Green, but
nowadays is frequently used in the Court.
8. Text of Clay's address to the Virginia legislature, Feb.7, 1822,
CP, 3:161-70.
9. Ibid., 176, and editorial note, 177.
10. Ibid., 176-77, 207-8, 215-18. An important reason for
Virginia's rejection was its dissatisfaction with Kentucky's reluctance to
recognize many claims of Virginians to extensive lands in western Ken-
tucky, based upon Old Dominion warrants for their military service. If
Kentucky had been more accommodating on this issue, there might have
been some sort of compromise by the two states on the land-occupant
question. Clay spent a great deal of time arranging appointments of
commissioners to arbitrate the disputes. That effort collapsed.
11. Ibid., 387.
12. Marshall and members of his family had been active in holding
land in Kentucky for a long time, but he did not participate in the case
and had transferred this property to relatives. However, his influence
on other members of the Court could have been a factor in the out-
come. Johnson, Chief Justiceship of John Marshall, 78.
13. 8 Wheaton 1-18 (1823). For reactions to the first hearing and
movement toward the second, see editorial note, CP, 3:91; William Duval
to Clay, ibid., 89-91; Governor John Adair's message to the Kentucky
legislature, Oct. 16,1821, Niks' Weekly Register, Nov. 17, 1821; Rich-
ard Biddle to Clay, Oct. 24 and 25, CP, 3:341-44.
14. 8 Wheaton 18-31, 58-69 (1823).
15. Ibid., 39-56.
16. Ibid., 57-58.
17. Ibid., 69-94.
18. Ibid., 94-107.
19. Niks' Weekly Register, Nov. 29, 1823.
20. Ibid., Dec. 27, 1823.
21. Clay to Benjamin W. Leigh, Dec. 22, 1823, CP, 3:550.
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22. Clay to Francis Brooke, Mar. 9,1823, ibid., 392. The report of
the debate in Congress, showing reaction to the Green decision, is in
Annals of Congress, 18:1 (1823), 2514-620. In Briscoe v Bank of Ken-
tucky, 11 Peters 257 (1837), Marshall was later reported to have said
that "the practice of this court is not (except in cases of absolute neces-
sity) to deliver any judgment where constitutional questions are involved,
unless four judges concur in opinion, thus making the decision that of
the whole court."
23. Adams, Memoirs, 6:138.
24. Clay to Francis Brooke, Aug. 28, 1823, CP, 3:478-79.
25. Speech in Congress, Mar. 13, 1818, CP, 2:472-73; Clay to
Francis Biddle, Aug. 7, 1824, ibid., 3:805.
26. Beveridge, Life of John Marshall, 4:371-75; Warren, Supreme
Court, 1:652-63.
27. Annals of Congress, 18 Cong., 1 sess., 2514-620.
28. Clay to Benjamin W. Leigh, July 31,1824, CP, 3:802-3; edito-
rial note, ibid., 803.
29. Bodley v Gaither, 19 Kentucky 57-59 (1825).
30. 5 Peters 457 (1831).
31. U.S. Constitution, art. 1, sec. 10, par. 1: "No State shall . . .
pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts."
32. U.S. Constitution, art. 1, sec. 10, par. 3: "No State shall, with-
out the consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact
with another State."
33. Frankfurter and Landis, "The Compact Clause of the Constitu-
tion." This comprehensive, authoritative article shows that the com-
pact clause and not the contract clause has been the provision applying
to interstate agreements.
34. A search of historians' interpretations of the Green case shows
little criticism of the Court's application of the contract clause to inter-
state relations. But a convincing view comes from Benjamin Wright in
Contract Clause of the Constitution, 46-47. He says the decision was
"perhaps the most far-fetched" extension of the contract clause. White,
Marshall Court, 76, is also an exception to most references. He con-
cludes the contract clause, rather than the compact clause, was "errone-
ously" applied.
35. 12 Wheaton 213-369 (1827). Sanders's name was often mis-
spelled as Saunders, as it is in the Supreme Court reports.
36. 4 Wheaton 122 (1819). The constitutional basis for Sturges
was art. 1, sec. 10, forbidding a state law that impairs the obligation of
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contracts. For the hearings and opinions on Sturges and Saunders, see
the description in Baxter, Daniel Webster, 110-19.
37. 12 Wheaton 226-37 (1827). The Court reporter combined the
arguments of 1824 and 1827 by counsel of each side. Thus there were
two hearings. Clay argued only in the first, in 1824.
38. Ibid., 237-54; Baxter, Daniel Webster, 112-19.
39. 12 Wheaton 237 (1827).
40. Ibid., 240; Konefsky and King, eds., The Papers of Daniel
Webster, Legal Papers. Vol.3, The Federal Practice, ed. by King, pt. 1,
317-23. Clay received some advice from the chief justice of the Ken-
tucky appellate court, John Boyle. Other information on this case is in
this reference.
41. 12 Wheaton, 254-70 (1827).
42. Ibid., 271-92. An informative discussion of these bankruptcy
cases is in White, Marshall Court, 648-56.
43. 12 Wheaton, 332-57 (1827).
44. Coleman, Debtors and Creditors in America, 269-93. See also
Warren, Bankruptcy in United States History.
45. Coleman, Debtors and Creditors in America, 104,127.
46. Baxter, Henry Clay, 169-70, 175-76.
47. 6 Howard 486 (1848).
48. Stone v Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 116 U.S. 307 (1886);
Munn v Illinois, 94 U.S.113 (1877). Wright, Contract Clause, 94-178,
is a good discussion of the relationship of the contract clause and the
due process amendment.
4. BANKING
1. Clay's agreement with John Hart to form a mercantile com-
pany, providing that Clay would supply capital of $20,000, [Jan. 29,
1816], CP, 2:159-60. Mortgage deed of Lexington estate, Ashland, with
bond executed to John Jacob Astor for $40,000, [Apr. 10,1819], ibid.,
685-87. Mortgage of Kentucky Hotel to Bank of the United States for
$22,000, [July 8,1820], ibid., 876-77.
2. Reporter, June 7, 1820, quoted in CP, 2:869.
3. Clay to Langdon Cheves, Nov. 5, 1820, ibid., 900-901.
4. Clay to Cheves, Feb. 10, 1821, ibid., 3:24-26; Cheves to Clay,
Feb. 23, 1821, ibid., 47-48; and Mar. 3, 1821, ibid., 57-58; Clay to
Cheves, June 23, 1822, ibid., 238. In his account book, Clay recorded
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his income as $10,030 for the period of January 1822 to March 1823.
Ibid., 3:402.
5. Clay to Cheves, Jan. 18, 1821, CP, Supplement, 83; Nicholas
Biddle to Clay, Dec. 31, 1823, CP, 3:557; Clay to Biddle, Jan. 3, 1824,
ibid., 558-60. Debts of the Johnsons to the BUS amounted to several
hundred thousand dollars. The editorial note in CP, Supplement, 83,
concludes that the bank came out of this financial problem well.
6. Clay to Cheves, Jan. 22, 1821, CP, 3:11-14. There are many
items concerning Clay's work as a BUS lawyer in the early 1820s in CP,
Supplement.
7. Clay to Gorham A. Worth, Dec. 12, 1820, CP, 2:909-10; Clay
to Cheves, Feb. 27, ibid., 50-51; and Mar. 10, 1821, ibid., 3:63-66;
Clay's circular letter to the bank's western offices on procedures, May
1, 1821, ibid., Supplement, 87-88.
8. Clay to George Jones, Oct. 7, 1822, ibid., 118-19.
9. Clay to George Jones, Nov. 21, 1822, ibid., 119-25.
10. 9 Peters 405-16 (1835); Clay to Langdon Cheves, June 16,
1822, CP, 3:228-34.
11. Clay to Cheves, ibid., 99.
12. Clay to Cheves, Jan. 12, 1822, ibid., 155.
13. Numerous instructions by Clay about these land cases have
been published in CP, Supplement.
14. Clay to Cheves, Sept. 13,1822, ibid., 286-87. Clay said he had
obtained 211 favorable judgments for the Cincinnati branch alone.
15. Biddle to Clay, Jan. 25,1823, ibid., 354-55, among other letters.
16. Charles Hammond to Clay, ibid., 3:245—46.
17. Stevens, "Clay, the Bank, and the West in 1824," 843-48.
18. Connelley and Coulter, History of Kentucky, 2:650-53; 4
Wheaton 316 (1819).
19. HC to Edmund W Rootes, Nov. 24, 1818, CP, 2:605.
20. Ibid.; Bank of the U.S. v Norton, 10 Kentucky 422-29 (1821),
reversing Bank of the U.S. v Norvell, 9 Kentucky 101-9 (1819).
21.2 Federal Cases 728-33 (1822); Clay to Cheves, Nov. 14,1819,
CP, 2:723.
22. Clay to Nicholas Biddle, Dec. 27,1822, CP, 3:347^8; the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals in Blair v Williams, decided that most of the
relief laws were invalid because they were retrospective. Niles' Weekly
Register, Nov. 8,1823, and Jan. 3, 1824. Later the Supreme Court held
that federal courts did not have to follow the procedural rules of Ken-
122 Notes to Pages 61-68
tucky courts, such as those affecting the judicial process against a debtor.
Wayman v Southard, 10 Wheaton 1 (1825).
23. Clay to Cheves, Dec. 3,1821, CP, 3:144.
24. Bogart, "Taxation of the Second Bank of the United States by
Ohio"; Huntington, "A History of Banking and Currency in Ohio,"
266-69, 283-91, 313-28.
25. Huntington, "A History of Banking and Currency in Ohio,"
314-18.
26. Ibid., 319.
27. Ibid.
28. Niks' Weekly Register, Jan. 20, 1821; Clay to Cheves, Sept. 8,
1821, CP, 3:111-13; Clay's statement about proceedings of the federal
circuit court, which appeared in the Washington National Intelligencer
and was reprinted in Niles' Weekly Register, Sept. 29, 1821.
29. Text of the circuit court's opinion in Niles' Weekly Register,
Sept. 9, 1820.
30. Text of Hammond's report in ibid., Jan. 20, 1821.
31. Ibid., Jan. 5, 1822, and Jan. 24 and 25, 1824; Bank of U. S. v
Planters' Bank, 9 Wheaton 904 (1824).
32. Niles' Weekly Register, Feb. 23, 1822. Several states did ex-
press some support for Ohio: Indiana, Illinois, Tennessee, Pennsylva-
nia, and Virginia. Beveridge, Life of John Marshall, 4:334.
33. Niles' Weekly Register, Oct. 30, 1819.
34. Clay to Cheves, Nov. 5, 1820, CP, 2:900-01.
35. Clay's resolution in the House, [Feb. 12, 1821], and editorial
note, CP, 3:31.
36. Clay to George Jones et al., Aug. 6, 1821, CP, Supplement,
93-94.
37. Clay to Cheves, Jan. 22 and 31,1821, CP, 3:13, 20-21.
38. Clay to Cheves, Feb. 15,1821, ibid., 41.
39. Clay to Cheves, Oct. 22, 1821, ibid., 128-29; Nicholas Biddle
to Clay, Feb. 4, 1823, CP, Supplement, 129-30.
40. 9 Wheaton 738-95 (1824).
41. Ibid., 795-811. See below for Marshall's opinion on this key
point.
42. U.S. v Peters, 5 Cranch 115 (1809).
43. Cohens v Virginia, 6 Wheaton 264 (1821).
44. While argument of Osborn was in progress, Clay had referred
to the Roberts case as a precedent in a letter of Feb. 17,1824, to Nicho-
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las Biddle. CP, 2>:6A6-A7. The report of Bank of U.S. v Roberts is in 2
Federal Cases 728-33 (1822).
45. Osborn v Bank, 9 Wheaton 816-71. Marshall also ruled against
Georgia in its claim of sovereign immunity from suit for its partially
owned state bank. He decided for the branch of the national bank. It
was a step toward a more favorable legal status of interstate corpora-
tions. Bank of U.S. v Planters' Bank, 9 Wheaton 904 (1824).
46. Osborn v Bank, 871-903.
47. Governor of Georgia v Madrazo, 1 Peters 110 (1828).
48. In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887); Currie, The Constitution in
the Supreme Court, 102-8, 418-28.
49. Among the many references in legal history on the long-range
question of sovereign immunity, the most useful is Jacobs, The Eleventh
Amendment and Sovereign Immunity.
50. Clay's resolutions, [Oct. 18, 1820], CP, 2:895.
51. Clay's memorandum of his assets, including debts due him by
the Bank of Kentucky, [Dec. 26,1822], CP, 3:345-46; Clay's agreement
with Bank of Kentucky, [Nov. 10, 1823], ibid., 519.
52. Clay to Nicholas Biddle, Dec. 6, 1823, ibid., 532-33; and also
to Biddle, Dec. 22, ibid., 548-49.
53. Clay to Littleton D. Teackle, Jan. 24, 1825, ibid., 4:40.
54. The bank had lost an earlier case in the Kentucky county and
appeals courts in Lampton v Commonwealth's Bank, 12 Kentucky 300-
301 (1822) on a ruling that its notes were unconstitutional bills of credit.
Now in the federal Supreme Court Briscoe was appealing another state
decision, Briscoe v Bank of Commonwealth, 30 Kentucky 349 (1832),
which had gone the other way, favorably for the Kentucky bank.
55. Craig v Missouri, 4 Peters 410 (1830). Reports of circuit court
cases are in U.S. Supreme Court Records and Briefs for the period 1836-
1838.
56. 11 Peters 257 (1837), headnote referring to the first hearing of
the case in 1834, in which Clay did not appear as counsel.
57. Ibid., 263-75, 285-311.
58. Ibid., 280-85.
59. Bank of Kentucky v Wister, 2 Peters 318 (1828). The Supreme
Court had, in fact, avoided holding state bank notes unconstitutional,
but did so on narrow grounds of jurisdiction. So both sides in the present
Briscoe case cited Wister to support their arguments.
60. 11 Peters 285 (1837).
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61. Ibid.
62. Ibid., 328-50.
63. Newmyer, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story, 222, criticizes
the majority for acting "out of ignorance or politics or both." It was an
abandonment of "scientific standards of adjudication," and an example
of "judicial subjectivism," that upset Story, the author says. Ibid., 234.
Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court, 207-8, convincingly
praises Story for "sparkling scholarship" in defining bills of credit.
Swisher, History of the Supreme Court, vol. 5, Taney Period, 1836-64,
107-9, does not take a strong interpretive position but provides a good
narrative and explains the connection of the case with state bank notes.
After looking into the large range of historical references, one can ac-
cept Story's interpretation of bills of credit as strictly constitutional but
recognize the importance of state bank notes in this period. None of the
viewpoints in the controversy was free of subjective politics.
64. In 1865 during extensive changes of wartime banking and cur-
rency, Congress taxed state bank notes out of circulation.
5. NONCONSTITUTIONAL BUSINESS
1. White, Marshall Court, 747.
2. Ibid., 751-74; Friedman, History of American Law, 202-24.
Some discussion of Clay's early land cases, including the Green case, is
presented in chaps. 1 and 2 above.
3. 16 Kentucky 459-68 (1821); CP, 3:84-85.
4. 9 Wheaton 241-56 (1824).
5. Ibid., 256-325. This was typical of an increasing number of
land cases handled by federal circuit courts on the basis of diversity of
citizenship of the parties, not involving a federal question. There is a
good discussion of the case and this trend in Johnson, Chief Justiceship
of John Marshall.
6. Clay to Lucas Brodhead, Jan. 17, 1821, CP, Supplement, 82-
83; and Mar. 8,1823, ibid., 134; 10 Wheaton 154-81 (1825).
7. 9 Peters 632-36 (1835).
8. 9 Peters 640-42 (1835).
9. 11 Peters 351-419 (1837). White, Marshall Court, 855, says
the Supreme Court had been allowing state courts to "exercise equity
jurisdiction even where a state had no equity courts."
Notes to Pages 85-91 125
10. 9 Peters 224-39 (1835).
11. Brown v Keene, 8 Peters 112-17 (1833); Preston v Keene, 14
Peters 113-40 (1840); Preston v Humphreys (1844), in Louisiana Su-
preme Court. See Burns, "Henry Clay Visits New Orleans."
12. Preston v Humphreys in Louisiana Supreme Court, argued by
Clay in 1844. The detailed litigation is described in Burns, "Henry Clay
Visits New Orleans." The final phase was discussed in Clay's corre-
spondence. Clay to Lucretia Clay, Jan. 28,1843, CP, 9:800-01; Isaac T.
Preston to Clay, Apr. 26, 1844, ibid., 10:10-11; and Clay to Preston,
May 4, 1844, ibid., 10:50-51.
13. 47 Kentucky 340-77 (1847).
14. Duncan McArthur to Clay, Jan. 8, 1821, CP, 3:7-8; Clay to
McArthur, Jan. 26,1821, ibid., 16; 9 Wheaton 469-83. Counsel's argu-
ments were not reported.
15. Thomas Hinde to Clay, Jan. 6,1821]. The case was first heard
in the federal circuit court of Ohio but the two judges were divided,
sending it on appeal to the Supreme Court. Clay did not participate in
the hearing there. 7 Wheaton 23-27 (1822).
16. 6 Peters 389 (1832). Afer the case had hobbled along for six-
teen years, the parties were understandably ready for an accommoda-
tion.
17. 14 Kentucky 177-86. The reporter commented in a headnote
that the outcome was a compromise, though the amounts allowed were
"disproportionate."
18. Clay v Hopkins and Hopkins v Clay, 10 Kentucky 485-89.
19. Jefferson to Clay, Aug. 28,1823, and editorial note, CP, 3:280-
81, citing Jefferson papers in the Library of Congress.
20. Clay's correspondence in 1829 about the case of young Charles
Wickliffe, as well as editorial notes, are useful on this subject. CP, 8,
passim. The standard source is Calvin Colton, ed., Life, Correspon-
dence, and Speeches, 1:90-93. Colton was Clay's friend and early biog-
rapher. A scholarly reference is Dwight Mikkelson, "The Kentucky
Gazette, 1787-1848."
21. Smiley, Lion of White Hall, 60-64; Cassius Clay, Life ofCassius
Marcellus Clay, 71-89.
22. 9 Wheaton 362-80 (1824); editorial note about the case in CP,
3:397-98.
23. Ann Garram et al. to Clay, editorial note, CP, 8:165.
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6.SLAVERY
1. 15 Peters 449 (1841).
2. Editorial note, CP, 9:475-76, is useful for the background of
the case.
3. 15 Peters 1-88 and appendix, i-lxxxv (1841).
4. Ibid., 452-76.
5. Ibid., 476-81.
6. Ibid., 481.
7. Ibid., 481-89.
8. Ibid., 489-503; Baxter, Daniel Webster, 209-11.
9. 15 Peters 496-503 (1841).
10. Ibid., 510-17.
11. McLean's opinion, ibid., 503-8; Baldwin's opinion, ibid., 510-
17.
12. Catterall, ed., Judicial Cases Concerning American Slavery, 3:
278-89, describes cases in the Mississippi courts.
13. 5 Howard 134 (1847).
14. Dred Scott v Sandford, 19 Howard 393 (1857).
15. 12 Howard 299 (1851).
16. Remini, Henry Clay, 508-11; Congressional Globe, 25 Cong.,
2 sess., appendix, 578-60.
17. Congressional Globe, 25 Cong., 2 sess., 199, 218, 328-32.
18. Rice v Bollard, discussed in Catterall, ed., judicial Cases Con-
cerning American Slavery, 3:278-79, 533-37.
7. OVERVIEW
1. There is an interesting itemized list of his legal materials in CP,
2:912-13.
2. When he left his service as secretary of state in 1829, following
the defeat of President John Quincy Adams for reelection, he inclined
not to return to a law practice and remarked, "I have not determined to
return to the practice of my old profession, and nothing but necessity
will compel me to put on the harness again. That I hope to be able to
avoid." Colton, ed., Private Correspondence, 233. But generally, his
correspondence demonstrated a very positive view of his law practice.
3. Clay to Jesse Burton Harrison, Sept. 11,1831, CP, 8:399^01.
4. Clay to Charles Lanman, Oct. 28,1817, ibid., 2:393.
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5. Clay to Henry Clay Jr., Apr. 20, 1831, CP, 8:329, is a typical
letter to his son.
6. Hall, Magic Mirror, 106-28, provides an informative view of
legal history during the years of Clay's practice.
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